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DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, 
AND INNOCENT VICTIMS: JUDICIAL 
CONSERVATISM OR CONSERVATIVE 
JUSTICES? 
David Chang* 
There is no satisfactory explanation of why the judge has the 
authority to impose his morality upon us. Various authors 
have attempted to explain that but the explanations amount to 
little more than the assertion that judges have admirable ca-
pacities that we and our elected representatives lack. The ut-
ter dubiety of that assertion aside, the professors merely state 
a preference for rule by talented and benevolent autocrats 
over the self-government of ordinary folk. Whatever one 
thinks of that preference, and it seems to me morally repug-
nant, it is not our system of government, and those who advo-
cate it propose a quiet revolution, made by judges. 
. Robert Borkl 
It is a tour de force ... to suggest that the courts can elaborate 
a strong set of fundamental rights against which to test the 
outcomes of the fair political process in the name of such 
amorphous concepts as ensuring the common good or a ':_just 
constitutional order." Any such freewheeling judicial lawmak-
ing is inconsistent with "[t]he policymaking power of repre-
sentative institutions, born of the electoral process [which] is 
the distinguishing characteristic of the [constitutional] 
system." 
Henry Monaghan2 
INTRODUCTION: SHADES OF INNOCENCE 
Imagine a white person. He is of moderate means, attended subur-
ban schools, and has worked hard to become a police officer. Today he 
is unemployed, however, because the government, his employer, has 
adopted an affirmative action program. Suffering from a governmental 
choice to cure the lingering effects of historic injustices, he is an "inno-
• Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A. Haverford College;J.D. Yale Law 
School. I would like to thank Richard Beck, Alon Harel, Rudolph Peritz, Michael Perry, 
Donald Rothschild, Joyce Saltalamachia, Richard Sherwin, David Schoenbrod,James Si-
mon, and Donald Zeigler for their time and comments on this Article. Thanks are due 
as well to the trustees and administration of New York Law School for a research grant 
that supported work on this Article. 
1. R. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 252 
(1990). 
2. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 371-72 (1981) (ci-
tations omitted). Professor Monaghan, a leading proponent of judicial conservatism, 
see infra note 6 and accompanying text, criticizes liberal activism in this Article. His 
objections apply to judicial activism toward politically conservative objectives as well. 
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cent victim" of the racial discrimination pervasive in America's past. 
He believes this is unfair. He hopes it is unconstitutional. 
Now imagine a black person. He is poor, attended inner city 
schools, and has worked hard because he wants to become a police of-
ficer. He will not achieve this goal, however, because he cannot pass 
the government's qualifying test. Suffering from a governmental 
choice not to address the lingering effects of historic injustices, he, also, 
is an "innocent victim" of the racial discrimination in America's past. 
He believes this is unfair. He hopes it is unconstitutional. 
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,3 the Supreme Court deter-
mined that harmful effects suffered by whites from government policies 
designed to serve the permissible purpose of redressing the continuing ef-
fects of past racial discrimination are constitutionally significant inequi-
ties that can be justified only by "compelling" state interests.4 In 
Washington v. Davis,5 however, the Court determined that the harmful 
effects disproportionately suffered by blacks from government policies 
designed to serve a permissible purpose, but which reinforce the effects of 
past racial discrimination, have no such constitutional significance, but 
are matters of equity fully within legislative discretion. In both cases, 
the Court's decisions were formed and supported by self-professedju-
dicial conservatives-advocates of judicial restraint who claim that 
courts should invalidate legislative choices not when a judge's personal 
values are offended, but only when constitutionally rooted public val-
ues clearly have been violated.6 Indeed, Justice White's majority opin-
3. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
4. Four Justices embraced this view in Wygant. Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Rehnquist joined the relevant portion of Justice Powell's plurality opinion. See infra 
text at notes 11-18. Justice White concurred separately, stating that "[w]hatever the 
legitimacy of hiring goals or quotas may be, the discharge of white teachers to make 
room for blacks" is unconstitutional because of its "effect" on those white teachers. 
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 295. Justice O'Connor, who otherwise joined justice Powell's opin-
ion, later explicitly embraced the view that permissibly motivated policies could be un-
constitutional because of their impact on "innocent" parties. See infra note 17. Justice 
Stevens also expressed this view in Wygant, but determined that the harmful effects suf-
fered by whites in that case were not sufficiently important to outweigh the state's inter-
ests. See infra note 101. He has, however, voted to invalidate affirmative action 
programs based on this principle in other cases. See id. Justices Scalia and Kennedy 
embraced this principle soon after joining the Court. See infra text at notes 42-44, 
105-111. 
5. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
6. judicial conservatives believe that constitutional interpretation should not be 
based only on ajudge's personal values. See, e.g., R. Bork, supra note 1, at 146 (judge 
"must notO make unguided value judgments of his own" in· interpreting Constitution). 
Dissenting in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 
(1973),Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, said: "Whether or not I might agree 
with [Justice Blackmun's] marshaling of values, ... 1 find no constitutional warrant for 
imposing such an order of priorities on the people and legislatures of the States." 
Bolton, 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia has criticized the Court's 
"self-awarded sovereignty" over the abortion issue, "where it has little proper business 
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ion in Davis rested squarely on premises of judicial conservatism: he 
viewed the equities of allocating the harmful consequences of laws 
"designed to serve neutral ends" as posing political questions fit not 
for courts, but rather for "legislative prescription."7 
This Article considers whether there is a valid justification for ac-
cording a different constitutional status to these two questions of social 
equity from the perspective of the principled judicial conservative.8 
since the answers to most of the cruel questions posed are political and not juridical." 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064 (1989) (Scalia,J., concur-
ring). Thus, the essence of judicial conservatism is a reluctance to make choices among 
controversial competing policies-to weigh competing permissible interests-without 
clear guidance from a constitutionally rooted hierarchy of values. 
While judicial conservatives do not all agree as to what constitutional interpretation 
should be, many refer to some version of originalism. See, e.g., R. Berger, Government 
by Judiciary 363-72 (1977); R. Bork, supra note 1, at 143-60. Others refer to "conven-
tional" political values. See, e.g., Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional 
Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 Yale LJ. 221, 266-67 (1973) (urg-
ing judicial review by reference to contemporary "conventional morality"); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (invalidating law 
prohibiting sale or use of contraception as contrary to "traditions and [collective] con-
science of our people") (citation omitted). Justice Harlan expressed a similar view, dis-
senting in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961): 
[T]he supplying of content to this Constitution[] .•. has not been one where 
judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. 
The balance ... is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what 
history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the tradi-
tions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. 
C£ R. Bork, supra note 1, at 253 (arguing that candid nonoriginalist methods of inter-
pretation at least would have to derive values "upon which all persons of good will and 
adequate intelligence must agree"). For the implications of a "conventional morality" 
approach to derive values for defining unconstitutional racial discrimination, see infra 
notes 69, 71, 146. 
7. 426 U.S. at 248. 
8. Concern for "innocent victims" of affirmative action has been widely addressed 
in the literature. See, e.g., Goodman, Equal Employment Opportunity: Preferential 
Quotas and Unrepresented Third Parties, 44 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 483, 506-15 (1976); 
Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitu-
tional Equality, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1729, 1760 (1989); Selig, Affirmative Action in Employ-
ment: The Legacy of a Supreme Court Majority, 63 Ind. LJ. 301, 350-53 (1987); 
Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 Harv. L. 
Rev. 78, 78-80, 91-97 (1986); Joint Statement, Constitutional Scholars' Statement on 
Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 98 Yale LJ. 1711, 1713-14 
( 1989) (recognizing judicial concerns for equitably spreading burden of remedies, but 
failing to confront such concerns in "Guidelines for Development of Future Stan-
dards"); Note, Wygant v.jackson Board of Education: Affirmative Action and the Innocent 
Party, 18 U. Toi. L. Rev. 519, 519 (1987); Case Comment, Effect of Minority Preference 
in Graduate School Admissions upon Equal Protection Rights ofNonminority, 11 Suf-
folk U. L. Rev. 1143, 1151 (1977). Yet no one has explored the potential inconsistency 
between according constitutional weight to this harm and Davis. Although Randall Ken-
nedy asserts that "the iajury suffered by white 'victims' of affirmative action does not 
properly give rise to a conStitutional claim, because the damage does not derive from a 
scheme animated by racial prejudice," he does not explain why the equal protection 
clause should be deemed concerned only with such impermissible motivation. See Ken-
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Part I considers whether Davis and Wygant can be reconciled on the 
ground that the cases involved different kinds of harm. It concludes 
that the harmful effects felt by individual claimants in each case are not 
distinguishable in any relevant manner. Part II considers whether the 
cases can be reconciled on the ground that Davis concerned the effects 
of facially neutral laws, whereas Wygant concerned the effects of racial 
classifications. It concludes that from the perspective of a consistent 
judicial conservative, reasons for denying special constitutional status 
to the equities of harmful impact suffered by disappointed black em-
ployees from traditional, facially neutral employment policies apply 
with equal force to the equities of harmful impact suffered by disap-
pointed white employees from racially-specific affirmative action 
policies. 
Part III suggests that those 'judicial conservatives" (notably, jus-
tices Rehnquist, White, Kennedy, Scalia, and O'Connor)-as well as the 
"swing justices" (Stevens and Powell)-who have viewed discrimina-
tory impact on "innocent white victims" as constitutionally significant 
have pursued the very sort of judicial activism by personal predilection 
that was rejected in Washington v. Davis. It then argues that a principled 
judicial conservative should enforce the same values when scrutinizing 
claims of unconstitutional racial discrimination by either facially neutral 
laws or affirmative action programs: in both contexts, the challenged 
regulation should be invalidated only upon a finding that it was 
adopted for purposes that are constitutionally prohibited-specifically, 
purposes reflecting racial prejudice.9 
Finally, Part IV explores how a judicial conservative should deter-
mine whether any given affirmative action program was adopted for the 
permissible purpose-untainted by racial animus, favoritism, or stereo-
nedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1327, 1336 (1986). 
9. Proscribed racial prejudice includes both the prescriptive (animus or favoritism) 
and the descriptive (stereotype). See infra text at notes 38-39. This is not to suggest 
that the Court should be deferential in determining whether prejudice has infected a 
challenged program. See infra text at notes 144-175. Rather, so long as the legislature 
has employed a racial classification for constitutionally permissible purposes, evils such 
as harmful impact should not be viewed as constitutionally relevant, but as matters for 
legislative accommodation. See also J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 135-72 (1980) (urg-
ing equal protection concern with racial prejudice); Simon, Racially Prejudiced Govern-
mental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial 
Discrimination, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1041, 1043 (1978) (finding that governmental ac-
tion motivated by racial prejudice should be sufficient and necessary condition for un-
constitutionality). But see Boyd, Purpose and Effect in the Law of Race Discrimination: 
A Response to Washington v. Davis, 57 U. Det.J. Urb. L. 707, 713-37 (1980) (making 
argument not based on judicial conservatism that racial impact should be constitution-
ally relevant irrespective of discriminatory purpose); Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal 
Protection, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1115-19, 1134-42 (1989) (criticizing conceptualiza-
tion of unconstitutional racial discrimination in terms of impermissible purposes). For 
an examination of the relationship between originalism and a principle prohibiting all 
government actions motivated by racial prejudice, see infra note 146. 
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type-of redressing the effects of past racial discrimination. This Part 
first examines barriers that the Court has erected against a finding of 
permissible purpose, and concludes that many of these barriers are not 
designed to uncover illicit purpose. Rather, like the inconsistent treat-
ment of harmful impact in Wygant and Davis, these barriers reflect hos-
tility by conservative Justices to nontraditional criteria for the 
distribution of public benefits and burdens. Part IV concludes by sug-
gesting five principles to guide judicial review of affirmative action pro-
grams and by examining how several landmark cases might have been 
resolved under these proposed standards. 
This Article suggests that personal values of political conservatism 
have pervaded the Supreme Court's decisions constraining legislative 
discretion to redress perceived racial inequity. The resulting conserva-
tive judicial activism reveals that protestations of judicial conservatism 
have been merely a facade.10 I write with the hope that through open 
recognition of this degeneration to conservative judicial activism, the 
Court's 'judicial conservatives"-present and future-might retreat 
within the self-proclaimed limits of their role, and return to electorally 
accountable policymakers the discretion to make either traditional (and 
nonracist) or nontraditional (and nonracist) judgments about the just 
distribution of public goods. 
I. WYGANT AND DAVIS: INDISTINGUISHABLE HARMS TO INDIVIDUALS 
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 11 a group of white public 
school teachers challenged the constitutionality of a layoff provision in 
a collective bargaining agreement. The provision required that in the 
event of teacher layoffs, "teachers with the most seniority ... shall be 
retained, except that at no time will there be a greater percentage of 
minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority per-
sonnel employed at the time of the layoff."12 "Minority personnel" in-
cluded "employees who are Black, American Indian, Oriental, or of 
Spanish descendancy."13 The program was justified as "an attempt to 
remedy societal discrimination by providing 'role models' for minority 
schoolchildren."14 
Justice Powell, in an opinion joined by Justices Rehnquist, 
10. With the resignation of Justice Brennan, yet another conservative activist may 
have joined the Court under the gnise of judicial conservatism. President Bush has fre-
quently expressed his desire "to appoint people to the Federal bench that will not legis-
late from the bench, who will interpret the Constitution." See, e.g., N.Y. Times,July 23, 
1990, at AS, col. 5. Justice Souter claims to be a judicial conservative-to subordinate 
his personal politics to the constraints of judging-but also is thought by some to be 
hostile to affirmative action. See, e.g., Molotsky, N.A.A.C.P. Urges Souter's Defeat, Cit-
ing Earlier Statements on Race, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1990, § I, at 7, col. I. 
11. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
12. Id. at 270. 
13. Id. at 271 n.2. 
14. Id. at 272. 
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O'Connor, and Chief Justice Burger, viewed this affirmative action pro-
gram as constitutionally problematic for several reasons. Most signifi-
cant for present purposes was his concern that the program imposed 
"discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people."15 
He elaborated: 
[T]he means chosen to achieve the Board's asserted purposes 
[of curing the effects of past racial discrimination] is that of 
laying off nonminority teachers with greater seniority in order 
to retain minority teachers with less seniority .... In cases in-
volving valid hiring goals, the burden to be borne by innocent 
individuals is diffused to a considerable extent among society 
generally. Though hiring goals may burden some innocent in-
dividuals, they simply do not impose the same kind of injury 
that layoffs impose. Denial of a future employment opportu-
nity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job. 
That burden is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a 
means of accomplishing purposes that otherwise may be legiti-
mate, the Board's layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored.16 
Thus, even if the School Board had pursued permissible purposes, its 
chosen means were unconstitutional because they imposed an exces-
sively harmful effect on "innocent white employees."17 Justice White, 
who provided the crucial fifth vote, concurred in the judgment, and ex-
pressed a similar concern with the "effect" of the policy in "laying off 
whites who would otherwise be retained in order to keep blacks on the 
job."18 
In Washington v. Davis,19 black applicants for jobs as District of Co-
lumbia police officers challenged a hiring test (known as "Test 21") 
that disqualified black candidates at four times the rate that it disquali-
15. Id. at 276. 
16. Id. at 282-83 (footnotes omitted). 
17. justice O'Connor did not concur with this portion of justice Powell's opinion. 
Id. at 268. Elsewhere, however, she has expressed concern with the impact of affirma-
tive action programs on "innocent victims." See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 
110 S. Ct. 2997, 3043 (1990) (O'Connor,J., dissenting) ("[g]overnment cannot employ 
race classifications that unduly burden individuals who are not members of the favored 
racial and ethnic groups"). 
18. 476 U.S. at 295 (White, J., concurring). Concern for the effects of affirmative 
action programs on "innocent white victims" has been a consistent factor tending to-
ward the invalidation of these programs ever since Bakke. See, e.g., id. at 317 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) ("Even ifthere is a valid purpose to the race consciousness, ... the ques-
tion that remains is whether that public purpose transcends the harm to the white [indi-
viduals] who are disadvantaged .... "); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 514 (1980) 
(Powell, J., concurring) ("race conscious remedy should not be approved without con-
sideration of ... the effect of the set-aside upon innocent third parties"); Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("inequity in forcing 
innocent persons ... to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making"). 
19. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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fied white candidates.20 They argued that because of the harmful im-
pact that blacks disproportionately suffered, the test should be deemed 
presumptively unconstitutional: it should be upheld only if the govern-
ment could demonstrate that it was necessary for predicting job 
performance. 21 
Justice White, for a majority of seven, held that the harmful impact 
disproportionately suffered by blacks is not a constitutionally problem-
atic inequity requiring extraordinary justification.22 Rather, under the 
majority's view, racial discrimination is unconstitutional only if the gov-
ernment has pursued a racially discriminatory purpose: 
The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct 
discriminating on the basis of race. . . . But our cases have not 
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, with-
out regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory :pur-
pose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially 
discriminatory impact. . . . "A purpose to discriminate must 
be present .... "23 
Justice White refused to accord constitutional status to these harmful 
effects because he feared that doing so would provide precedent for 
invalidating "a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, 
and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to 
the average black than to the more affluent white."24 In his view, the sort 
20. Id. at 237. 
21. See id. 
22. Davis rejected the proposition that the fourteenth amendment's standard for 
impermissible racial discrimination is the same as the Title VII standard elucidated in 
Griggs v. Duke Power, 401U.S.424 (1971). ln Griggs, the Court determined that even 
without discriminatory purpose, "the consequences of employment practices" could be the 
basis for their invalidation under Title VII if they were not sufficiently related to job 
performance. Id. at 432. "What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, 
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously 
to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.'' Id. at 431. 
Thus, in Title VII, Congress made a judgment about the importance of employer discre-
tion to use traditional selection criteria, and the importance of a racially discriminatory 
harmful impact, and struck a balance at the point of job-relatedness. For a suggestion 
that any definition of 'job-relatedness" itself requires contestable judgments about the 
relative importance of public (or employer) goals versus private (or employee) interests, 
see infra note 85. 
23. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945)). 
Justice White acknowledged, however, that discriminatory impact could be evidence of 
an impermissible racially discriminatory purpose. See id. at 242. 
24. Id. at 248 (emphasis added). Although it is unclear whether Justice White 
would agree, it is reasonable to attribute the racially discriminatory impact of the broad 
range of governmental policies about which he was so concerned to the effects of past 
racial discrimination pervasive in American society. In Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (plurality opinion), Justice O'Connor recognized historical reality 
to some degree noting that "there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and 
public discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black 
entrepreneurs." Id. at 724. 
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of judgment required for balancing the importance of harmful effects 
disproportionately felt by blacks against the importance of policies that 
cause those effects was not for courts, but for "legislative 
prescription. "25 
Consider two arguments that the harms involved in Davis and Wy-
gant are distinguishable in some relevant way and, therefore, that the 
cases do not inconsistently treat the constitutional status of harmful im-
pact. First, one might argue that the harm in Davis-being denied a 
new job- is far less significant than the harm in Wygant-losing a job 
already held. This argument misses the mark because Davis held that 
harmful impact is constitutionally irrelevant except as evidence of imper-
missible purpose. There was no suggestion that the black police appli-
cants had suffered harms insufficiently serious to warrant invalidating 
Test 21. Indeed, one can construct a Davis-type case (i.e., a challenge 
to facially neutral selection criteria that disproportionately harm blacks) 
involving Wygant-type harms (i.e., losing a job). If, for example, black 
teachers challenged a seniority system on the ground that blacks were 
disproportionately harmed by the loss of their jobs, the Court would 
apply Davis's doctrine that harm disproportionately suffered by blacks 
from facially neutral selection criteria has no intrinsic constitutional sig-
nificance. Despite the harms suffered in losing jobs once held-the 
same harms as those at issue in Wygant-the seniority system would be 
upheld without considering whether the government's underlying 
objectives were "compelling."26 
Second, one might argue that the two cases involve two very differ-
25. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248. For an analysis of the kind of judgments one must make 
in order to evaluate the relative importance of harmful effects. disproportionately suf-
fered by blacks versus the importance of traditional policies that cause those effects, see 
infra text at notes 63-90. For further suggestions that ad hoc judicial balancing trans-
gresses limits on the judicial role, see Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Bal-
ancing, 96 Yale LJ. 943, 984-85 (1987). 
26. Indeed, in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), the 
Court invalidated a district court injunction against a public fire department's traditional 
seniority system. The injunction was based in part on the seniority system's racially 
discriminatory effects-its "undue hardship" on the respondent class of black firefight-
ers. Id. at 576. Justice White held for the Court that the district court exceeded its 
authority in entering the injunction because Title VIl creates an explicit exception to the 
statute's general policy that employment policies having a racially discriminatory impact 
are presumptively invalid. See id. at 576-77; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988) 
(seniority standards that "are not the result of an intent to discriminate because of race" 
are not unlawful). Perhaps because it was so clearly established by Davis that harmful 
impact disproportionately suffered by one race or another has no intrinsic constitutional 
significance, the argument that the seniority system was invalid was based only on Title 
VII; the equal protection clause was ignored. Furthermore, because Congress has no 
constitutional authority to regrant to states discretion denied to them by judicial inter-
pretations of the equal protection clause, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 
n.10 (1966), the Court in Stotts, by euforcing § 703(h) of Title VII, implicitly affirmed 
the Davis doctrine that the effect of losing a (government) job-i.e., a Wygant-type 
harm-is constitutionally irrelevant. 
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ent claims of constitutional harm: harm to a group versus harm to indi-
viduals. In Davis, harm to a group was rejected as being 
constitutionally insignificant. That members of a certain group-
blacks-were disproportionately denied jobs was not enough to require 
extraordinary justification fqr the government's policies for distributing 
these social benefits. In Wygant, however, the Court considered harm 
to individuals as a potentially dispositive constitutional evil.27 That in-
dividuals might lose their jobs is enough to require extraordinary justi-
fication for the government's policies for distributing these social 
benefits.28 Thus, if one accepts justice Powell's proposition that "it is 
the individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifica-
tions based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions 
impinge upon personal rights, rather than the individual only because of his 
membership in a particular group, " 29 one might view the disparity be-
tween the treatment of harm to a group in Davis and the treatment of 
harm to individuals in Wygant as entirely consistent. 
Though effective rhetoric, the notion that people should be treated 
as individuals, and not simply as members of a group,80 is of little ana-
lytical significance. All statutes operate through classification. Thus, 
statutes always treat people as members of groups and, in general, leg-
islatures are free to classify so long as they pursue their permissible 
objectives rationally.81 If, however, one means to say that the govern-
ment potentially violates individual rights by treating people as mem-
27. Justice Powell stated: "[T]he petitioners before us today are not 'the white 
teachers as a group.' They are Wendy Wygant and other individuals .•. .'' Wygant, 476 
U.S. at 281 n.8. 
28. Justice Powell said: "Even a temporary layoff may have adverse financial as 
well as psychological effects.'' Id. at 283. 
29. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (plurality opinion) 
(emphasis added). 
30. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3028 (1990) (O'Connor, 
J ., dissenting) ("At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the 
simple command that the government must treat citizens 'as individuals, not simply "as 
components of racial, religious, sexual, or national class.'' ' ") (quoting Arizona 
Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983) (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of 
Water &Powerv. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978)); see also id. at 3032 ("The right to 
equal protection is a personal right, ... securing to each individual an immunity from 
treatment predicated simply on membership in a particular racial or ethnic group.''). 
31. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1955) (individ-
uals treated as optometrists); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 
(1949) (individuals treated as advertisers); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 
U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (individuals treated as manufacturers of filled milk). In each of 
these cases, the Court permitted regulation of individuals who claimed that they could 
be left unregulated without threatening the government's valid regulatory objective. 
Under "rationality review," the Court accords wide latitude for legislative discretion to 
serve any permissible objective- and any grouping of permissible objectives-by 
whatever means the government considers expedient. See Lee optical, 348 U.S. at 489; 
see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420-21 (1819) (Congress may 
employ any means, not independently prohibited, to serve permissible ends, subject 
only to political check). 
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hers of certain kinds of groups-such as racial groups- one still must 
specify what individual right-what relevant constitutional value-is vi-
olated by the classification. 
One might view governmental classification of individuals by race 
or otherwise-indeed, any government policy-as constitutionally sig-
nificant for its purposes, the factual premises on which it relies, or its 
effects. The proposition that the government may not act because of 
racial animus or favoritism proscribes certain motives. The proposition 
that the government may not act because of racial stereotype proscribes 
reliance on certain factual premises. No Justice denies that equal pro-
tection encompasses these proscriptions-each of which can be stated 
as an individual right: the right not to be regulated because of racial 
animus, favoritism, or stereotype. 
Furthermore, individuals felt the harmful effect deemed without in-
trinsic constitutional significance in Davis no less than individuals felt 
the impact considered in Wygant. Mr. Davis is an individual. He was 
denied a job because of the government's selection criteria. Someone 
else got that job because of the government's selection criteria. Simi-
larly, if the government had not adopted a policy to insulate black 
teachers from being disproportionately laid off, the harm that Wendy 
Wygant suffered in losing her job would have been felt by someone 
else-a black teacher.32 Yet under Davis, the harm that this individual 
black jobholder would have suffered from a traditional last-hired, first-
fired principle is constitutionally irrelevant.33 Under Wygant, the harm 
that the white job holder did suffer from a nontraditional policy of com-
pensating for effects of past racial discrimination provides a basis for 
invalidation. 
Thus, the distinction is not in whether the harm suffered is charac-
terized as "group" or "individual," but rather, which individual suf-
fered the harm. One person got a job; another did not. One person 
was fired; another was not. Who suffered the harm in Davis and Wygant 
was a function of the policies underlying the government's distribution 
of public benefits and burdens. The issue for judicial conservatives, 
therefore, must be whether there is a constitutionally supportable dis-
tinction between the policies that caused the harm individuals felt in 
each case. 34 
32. justice Marshall recognized this in his dissent in Wygant: "[S]omeone will lose a 
job under any layoff plan and, whoever it is, that person will not deserve it." 476 U.S. at 
307 (Marshall, J ., dissenting). 
33. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
34. Cf. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 542 (1982) 
(proposition that "people who are alike should be treated alike" has meaning only 
through application of external substantive values). 
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II. PuRPOSE, IMPACT, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF 
RACIAL CLASSIFICATION 
This Part considers, from the perspective of a judicial conservative, 
whether the presence of a racial classification provides a constitution-
ally supportable distinction between the policies challenged in Wygant 
and Davis that can justify the different treatment of harmful impact in 
the two cases. Part A examines the relationship between racial classifi-
cations and two types of constitutionally problematic purpose: imper-
missible purposes to discriminate because of racial prejudice and 
disfavored, but permissible, purposes to discriminate based on race. 
Part B considers whether a judicial conservative should be concerned 
with the equities of harmful impact caused by racial classifications 
found not to have been adopted because of impermissible racial 
prejudice. 
A. Interpreting Davis: Impermissible Purposes and Disfavored, but 
Permissible, Purposes 
Davis and Wygant might be distinguishable on the ground that pub-
lic benefits were distributed without a racial classification in the former, 
but with a racial classification in the latter. But why should the harm 
from being denied a job or being laid off be constitutionally significant 
when the government's selection criteria in pursuit of permissible pur-
poses includes a racial classification, while the same harm is considered 
constitutionally irrelevant when the government's selection criteria 
(also used in pursuit of permissible purposes) are traditional and, on 
their face, racially neutral? 
Consider, again, Justice White's point of departure in Davis: "But 
our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official 
act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory pur-
pose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially discriminatory 
impact. ... 'A purpose to discriminate must be present ... .' "35 One 
might read Davis as suggesting that certain racially-oriented purposes 
are impermissible per se. These impermissible purposes would be both 
necessary and sufficient to establish unconstitutionality. While harmful 
impact disproportionately suffered by blacks might serve as evidence 
that the government acted with an impermissible purpose,36 it has no 
intrinsic or normative constitutional significance. This interpretation 
of Davis is inconsistent with Wygant's assertion that harmful impact can 
have intrinsic constitutional significance when the government pursues 
35. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 
U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945)). 
36. justice White suggested that "an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be 
inferred from the totality of relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law 
bears more heavily on one race than another." Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. 
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constitutionally permissible purposes and, therefor~, it cannot serve to 
reconcile the two cases. 
Alternatively, one might read Davis as suggesting that certain ra-
cially-oriented purposes are not impermissible per se, but are constitu-
tionally disfavored. These disfavored but permissible purposes would 
be necessary, but not sufficient, to establish unconstitutionality. If the 
government acts with a disfavored, but permissible, purpose, harmful 
impact might become significant as a constitutional evil that can be jus-
tified only by a sufficiently weighty-or "compelling"-state interest. 
Without a constitutionally disfavored purpose, however, harmful im-
pact disproportionately suffered by one race or another has no in-
dependent constitutional significance. 
This reading could provide a basis for reconciling Davis and Wy-
gant if two conditions are satisfied: first, a constitutionally disfavored, 
but permissible, purpose must be found in Wygant but not in Davis; and, 
second, the rationale for viewing that purpose as disfavored, but per-
missible, must be related to the equities of harmful impact. 
All racial classifications reflect a purpose to discriminate based on 
race-a purpose to use race as a sorting tool. Furthermore, all racial 
classifications are subject to special judicial scrutiny. But because the 
Court has held that not all racial classifications are unconstitutional, a 
purpose to discriminate based on race is not itself constitutionally im-
permissible. 57 Thus, the purpose to discriminate based on race is con-
37. Justice Scalia has come close to asserting that all racial classifications are uncon-
stitutional. In Croson, he cited the slogan that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind," City of 
Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 735 (1989) (concurring opinion) (quoting 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan,J., dissenting)), and indicated that 
this principle could be violated in "only a social emergency rising to the level of immi-
nent danger to life and limb-for example, a prison race riot, requiring temporary seg-
regation of inmates." Id. But because the equal protection clause originally permitted 
racial segregation and policies of race-conscious animus, a principle of complete "color-
blindness" is no more rooted in original intent than is a principle that all governmental 
actions motivated by racial prejudice are unconstitutional. See infra note 146. Indeed, 
Plessy v. Ferguson likely enforced original intent. See Chang, Conflict, Coherence, and 
Constitutional Intent, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 753, 836-38, 846-50 (1987). Furthermore, it has 
been suggested that the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended to permit not 
only racial classifications that served racism, but also racial classifications that amelio-
rated the plight of blacks: 
From the closing days of the Civil War until the end of civilian Reconstruction 
... , Congress adopted a series of social welfare programs whose benefits were 
expressly limited to blacks. These programs were generally open to all blacks, 
not only to recently freed slaves, and were adopted over repeatedly expressed 
objections that such racially exclusive measures were unfair to whites. The 
race-conscious . . . programs were enacted concurrently with the fourteenth 
amendment and were supported by the same legislators who favored the con-
stitutional guarantee of equal protection. 
Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 71 Va. L. Rev. 753, 754 (1985) (footnote omitted). Thus, one who advocates a 
nonoriginalist, constitutionally mandated color-blindness must explain why legislatures 
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stitutionally disfavored, but permissible, and can provide the basis for a 
determination of unconstitutionality in conjunction with other findings. 
In contrast, the Court has determined that governmental purposes 
reflecting racial prejudice are impermissible per se. Impermissible ra-
cial prejudice includes both value judgments about race (animus or fa-
voritism) and unexamined factual premises based on race (stereotype). 
Justice O'Connor described the constitutional concern with both pre-
scriptive and descriptive racial prejudice in City of Richmond v. ].A. Croson 
Co., 38 as she explained and justified subjecting racial classifications to 
"strict scrutiny": 
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for 
... race-based measures, there is simply no way of determin-
ing what classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what 
classifications are in fact motivated by iUegitimate notions of racial 
inferiority or simpk racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict 
scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring 
that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough 
to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures 
that the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely 
that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classifi-
cation was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype. 39 
Thus, Justice O'Connor suggests that strict scrutiny is a mecha-
nism by which a court determines whether the government has pursued 
impermissible purposes reflecting racial prejudice.4° From this per-
spective, because racial classifications are presumptively unconstitu-
tional, the (permissible but disfavored) purpose to discriminate based 
on race is disfavored because it suggests a likelihood that the govern-
ment has pursued impermissible purposes reflecting racial prejudice.41 
should be prohibited from pursuing permissible, nonracist purposes by means of a racial 
classification. Any relevant explanation is likely to reflect some idea about the evils of 
racial classification discussed infra: the impact on human dignity or the promotion of 
racial hostility. My discussion of why these potential evils of racial classifications do not 
justify an independent concern with the equities of harmful impact felt by "innocent 
white victims" of affirmative action, see infra text at notes 42-59, applies as well to con-
stitutionally mandated color-blindness, from the perspective of the nonoriginalist judi-
cial conservative. 
38. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). 
39. Id. at 721 (emphasis added). 
40. See id.; see also Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term- Forward: In Defense 
of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1976) ("race-dependent deci-
sions that are rational and purport to be based solely on legitimate considerations are 
likely in fact to rest on assumptions of the differential worth of racial groups or on the 
related phenomenon of racially selective sympathy and indifference"); Simon, supra 
note 9, at 1067 ("The fact that racial classifications are suspect means only that , , , a 
court should very carefully assess whether the rules would have been enacted or main-
tained but for racial prajudice, with the burden of credibly disproving such motivation 
upon the government."). 
41. Thus, "[u]nder strict scrutiny the means chosen to accomplish the State's as-
serted [permissible] purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish 
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This rationale for viewing the purpose of discriminating based on 
race as constitutionally disfavored is rebutted when a court determines 
that a racial classification was not adopted because of racial prejudice. 
Furthermore, if a court determines that the government has acted be-
cause of impermissible racial prejudice, it need not consider the 
"weightiness" of the challenged policy toward justifying other puta,tive 
constitutional evils such as the inequities of harmful impact. The im-
permissible purpose alone is sufficient to establish unconstitutionality. 
Thus, under the view that the purpose to discriminate based on race-
the use of a racial classification-is constitutionally permissible, but dis-
favored because it suggests a likelihood of impermissible racial preju-
dice, the equities of harmful impact should have been deemed 
irrelevant in both Davis and Wygant. 
B. Racial Classifications Not Empwyed Because of Impermissible Racial 
Prejudice: Should the Equities of Harmful Impact Be Deemed 
Constitutionally Significant 1 
To distinguish Wygant from Davis based on the presence of a racial 
classification, therefore, one must go beyond the proposition that the 
government may not act because of racial prejudice. One must identify 
some other constitutional value that is both compromised by the disfa-
vored but permissible intent to discriminate based on race, and related 
to the equities of harmful impact suffered by "innocent" whites from 
otherwise valid affirmative action programs. 
Justice Scalia and his conservative colleagues have suggested that 
racial classifications, because of their obvious intent to discriminate 
that purpose." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986) (plurality 
opinion); accord Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 723, 727 & n.26 (1974). Conversely, because the Court views facially neutral 
actions as presumptively valid, and to the extent that constitutional invalidity turns on 
whether the government has acted because of racial prejudice, judicial review presumes 
that when the government acts in a facially neutral way, it likely has not acted because of 
impermissible racial prejudice. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. "Metropolitan 
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.15 (1977) ("to recognize the limited probative 
value of disproportionate impact [in proving impermissible purpose] is merely to ac-
knowledge the 'heterogeneity' of the Nation's population"). Under Arlington Heights, the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that "invidious discriminatory purpose" was "a 
motivating factor" underlying a facially neutral p9licy. Id. at 266. "Proof that the deci-
sion ... was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose would ... sbiftO to 
the [government] the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted 
even had the impermissible purpose not been considered." Id. at 270-71 n.21. For 
further discussion of the implications of Arlington Heights, see infra note 45; see also 
Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assessment After Fee-
ney, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1376, 1384 (1979) (facially neutral policies warrant no presump-
tion that government "relied on forbidden considerations; in fact, an opposite 
presumption is warranted"). 
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based on race,42 can violate notions of human dignity43 and foment 
racial prejudice.44 This section will consider, from the perspective of 
the principled judicial conservative, whether these putative evils of ra-
cial classifications should trigger constitutional concern with the equi-
ties of harmful impact.45 
42. justice Scalia has suggested that the intent to discriminate based on race itself 
can justify concern with discriminatory impact that is constitutionally irrelevant when the 
government acts with facially neutral means. "A State ... may adopt a preference for 
small businesses, or even for new businesses. . . . Such programs may well have racially 
disproportionate impact, but they are not based on race.'' Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 788 
(Scalia,j., concurring in the judgment). It is revealing that justice Scalia here supposes 
that preferring small businesses rather than large, or new businesses rather than old, 
would have a discriminatory impact on whites-but be valid because based on nonracial 
criteria. One might question whether favoring small or new businesses would truly dis· 
proportionately favor blacks, or simply disfavor blacks less than do traditional business 
practices. A preference for small business would disproportionately favor blacks only if 
blacks disproportionately comprised the population of small business entrepreneurs. 
Thus, justice Scalia has quite oddly transformed nontraditional policies that less disfa· 
vor blacks into policies that favor blacks and disfavor whites. 
43. See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
44. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
45. Despite the effort that follows to reconcile the treatment of harmful impact in 
Davis and Wygant, the majority's elaboration on Davis in Arlington Heights strongly sug· 
gests that the "racially discriminatory purpose" required in Davis to establish unconsti· 
tutionality was an impermissible purpose to discriminate because of race rather than the 
disfavored but permissible purpose to discriminate based on race. In specifying the bur· 
den of proving unconstitutional racial discrimination by a facially neutral law, justice 
Powell, joined by Chief justice Burger andjustices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, 
declared that the challenger must prove that "invidious discriminatory purpose was a 
motivating factor" in the government's decision. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (em· 
phasis added). Meeting this burden would "shift[] to the [State] the burden of establish· 
ing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impennissible purpose not 
been considered." Id. at 270-71 n.21 (emphasis added). Reference to "invidious,'' 
"motivating," and "impermissible purpose" strongly suggests that the Court is con· 
cerned not with the permissible but disfavored intent to discriminate based on race, but 
with impermissible purposes motivated by racism. The Court's continuing lack of con· 
cern for "fairness" or "equity" beyond the issue of impermissible purpose is suggested 
by justice Powell's declaration that if the state proves that the same decision would have 
been made absent impennissible considerations, "the complaining party . . . no longer 
fairly could attribute the iajury complained of to improper consideration of a discrimina· 
tory purpose. . . . [f)here would be no justification for judicial interference with the 
challenged decision." Id. Indeed, earlier in his opinion, justice Powell emphasized that 
legislatures have discretion to accommodate competing, permissible objectives as they 
wish: "In fact, it is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with 
balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the 
merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. But racial 
discrimination is not just another competing consideration.'' Id. at 265. If by "racial 
consideration" Powell means impennissible racist purpose, as he did when using the words 
"invidious," "motivating," and "impermissible," the inconsistency between Davis and 
Wygant is confirmed. 
Further confirmation that the "purpose to discriminate" required by the Court in 
Davis to invalidate a facially neutral policy was an impermissible racist purpose, rather 
than the disfavored, but permissible, purpose to discriminate based on race, is provided 
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1. Human Dignity. - Being categorized according to one's race 
can be offensive.46 Yet most people seem comfortable labelling them-
selves, and others, by race and ethnicity. The government routinely 
collects demographic statistics in which race and ethnicity are impor-
tant categories.47 Thus, at least for certain purposes, classification by 
race is accepted. 
When a racial classification is employed to serve a racist motive or 
perspective, however, those classified are dehumanized by the underly-
ing racism. In this context, suggesting that racial classifications can of-
fend notions of human dignity simply restates the proposition that 
racial classifications might have been employed because of racial preju-
dice, and policies reflecting racial prejudice offend human dignity. This 
concern for human dignity would be satisfied by a finding that the gov-
ernment had met its burden of proving that its challenged racial classifi-
cation had been employed for permissible, nonracist purposes. 
When a court finds that an affirmative action program employing 
racial classifications is intended to compensate for the effects of past 
racial discrimination, and does not rest on racial animus, favoritism, or 
stereotype, it holds that the program serves a purpose that does not 
itself reflect racial prejudice.48 When disadvantaged by an affirmative 
by the Court's expansion on the meaning of "discriminatory purpose" in Personnel 
Adm'r v. Feeney: 
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as volition or in-
tent as awareness of consequences. . . . It implies that the decisionmaker ... 
selected or reaffirmed a particitlar course of action at least in part "because of," 
not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. 
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). The disfavored, but permissible purpose to discriminate 
based on race might well have been pursued "in spite of" an adverse impact on an 
identifiable group. This is not so with actions motivated by an impermissible purpose to 
discriminate because of racial animus or favoritism. Thus, the cases on invalid racial 
discrimination achieved through facially neutral means fairly well establish that the 
Court viewed the essence of unconstitutionality in Davis as impermissible racist pur-
poses-necessary and sufficient to establish unconstitutionality. 
46. Justice Scalia expressed this view in Croson. "'[A] racial quota derogates the 
human dignity and individuality of all to whom it is applied; it is invidious in principle as 
well as in practice.'" 109 S. Ct. at 739 (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 
A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 133 (1975)). 
47. See, e.g., 1980 Census of Population and Housing, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, Advance Estimates of Social, Economic and Housing Characteris-
tics: Part 34, New York (Suppl. Rpt.), at 34.75- 34.116 (categorizing people as "white, 
black, American Indian, Eskimo or Aleut, Asia and Pacific Islander, Spanish origin") 
(March 1983). 
48. Cf. Brest, supra note 40, at 16-17 (arguing that it is unlikely that affirmative 
action programs are "premised on assumptions that blacks are superior to whites or on 
the selective indifference of white decisionmakers to the humanity or aspirations of 
whites compared to blacks"). The absence of selective indifference might be less clear, 
however, in a locality governed by a black majority. See Ely, supra note 41, at 739 n.58 
("a law that favors Blacks over Whites would be suspect if it were enacted by a predomi-
nantly Black legislature"); see also Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 722 (because five of the nine 
seats on the City Council were held by blacks, "[t]he concern that a political majority will 
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action program designed to remedy the lingering effects of past racial 
discrimination, therefore, an "innocent white victim" is passed over not 
because he is white, but because there is little or no reason to believe--
based on his being white-that he suffers from the effects of past racial 
discrimination.4 9 
Thus, once a court determines that an affirmative action program 
was not adopted because of racial animus, favoritism, or stereotype, the 
"innocent white victim" is offended, if at all, not by racist insult, but by 
disagreement with the legislative judgment that the public benefit he 
otherwise would receive under traditional policies should be trans-
ferred to someone else to help redress the effects of past racial discrimi-
nation. 50 So viewed, the concerns of"innocent" whites are less matters 
more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted assumptions or 
incomplete facts would seem to militate for, not against, the application of heightened 
judicial scrutiny in this case"). The absence of racist stereotyping in such a locality is 
similarly unlikely. As Justice Stevens has suggested: ' 
The risk that habitual attitudes toward classes of persons, rather than analysis 
of the relevant characteristics of the class, will serve as a basis for a legislative 
classification is present when benefits are distributed as well as when burdens 
are imposed .... 
When Congress creates a special preference, or a special disability, for a 
class of persons, it should identify the characteristic that justifies the special 
treatment. When the classification is defined in racial terms, I believe that such 
particular identification is imperative. 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 552-53 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted). 
49. Justice Powell implicitly acknowledged this distinction in Bakke. He noted that 
preferring people "because of" race is "facially invalid,'' Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (plurality opnion), while racial classifications (i.e., dis-
crimination based on race) used to achieve the "legitimate and substantial interest" of 
rectifying effects of past discrimination could be permissible. Id. at 307-IO; see also 
Rosenfeld, supra note 8, at 1788-89 (distinguishing discrimination "because of" race 
and racial discrimination toward permissible ends). Even so, one might still argue that 
the diguity of "innocent white victims" is offended because the racial classification im-
poses disabilities disproportionately on whites, and grants benefits disproportionately to 
blacks, without an underlying certainty that those harmed do not-and that those benefit-
ted do-suffer from the effects of past racial discrimination. Cf. Brest, supra note 40, at 
10 ("Although all of us recognize that institutional decisions must depend on general-
izations based on objective characteristics of persons and things rather than on individu-
alized judgments, we nonetheless tend to feel unfairly treated when disadvantaged by a 
generalization that is not true as applied to us."). The extent of underinclusiveness or 
overinclusiveness might well preclude a finding that the classification was not adopted 
because ofimpermissible racial animus, favoritism, or stereotype. See infra text at notes 
172-175. If so, the basis for invalidation would not be that the government has "un-
fairly" balanced competing equities, but that its action was based on racism-impermis-
sible per se. This finding would invalidate the program consistently with Davir-based 
not on evaluating the inequities of impact, but on proof of impermissible purpose. 
50. Paul Brest argues that "an individual's moral claim to compensation loses force 
as the nature, extent, and consequences of the wrongs inflicted become harder to iden-
tify and the wrongs recede into the past." See Brest, supra note 40, at 42. Thus, unlike 
a judicial remedy to compensate one individual for a specific harm inflicted by another, a 
legislative remedy to benefit one black individual, ignore a white individual (in his 
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of "dignity" compromised by racial classification than issues of putative 
entitlement to social benefits based on traditional selection criteria-
for example, seniority, low bid, or high scores. The constitutional sta-
tus, if any, of these criteria of putative entitlement should be ascer-
tained on their own terms, rather than under the guise of "dignity" 
interests triggered by racial classifications.51 
2. Promoting Racial Prejudice. - justices Scalia and O'Connor have 
expressed concern that efforts to redress the effects of past racial dis-
crimination might foment racism among people who feel that their am-
bitions have been thwarted by affirmative action programs and, 
thereby, foster political divisions and social tensions along racial 
lines.52 Assuming its validity,53 this rationale for viewing harmful im-
words, the "nonpreferred"), and harm yet another white individual (the "disprefer-
red"), "premised on a greater probability that the minority's situation is the result of 
past injury" is more difficult to justify. Id. at 42-43. Yet Brest concedes that his argu-
ment is about proper policy rather t_han constitutionality: 
Judicial supervision of other agencies' efforts to remedy racial injustices should 
be rather limited .... Under the approach proposed in this essay, all or most 
preferential employment and admissions programs would survive constitu-
tional scrutiny. It is a truism-only because it is true---that a practice may be 
unwise or even unfair and yet not be unconstitutional. 
Id. at 53-54. 
51. See infra text at notes 60-90. 
52. See, e.g., Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721 (racial classifications can promote notions of 
racial inferiority and promote the "politics of racial hostility"); id. at 735, 739 (Scalia,J., 
concurring in the judgment) ("The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past racial 
discrimination is as nothing compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society 
the source of those effects .... "); id. at 739 (lamenting divisive societal effects of"racial 
quotas"); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3029 (1990) (O'Connor,J., 
dissenting) (racial classifications "contribut[e] to an escalation of racial hostility and con-
flict''); see also Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law 
School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 571-72 (1975) (racial classification can pro-
mote prejudice). 
53. A constitutional principle invalidating remedial legislation on the grounds that 
it can unleash latent racism would be inconsistent with the Court's suggestion in Pal-
more v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984), that the government may not make policy 
that accommodates racism in the name of protecting the victims of racism. In Palmore, 
the Court reversed a trial court decree that had terminated a white mother's custody of 
her child after she had married a black man. The basis for the custody decree was not 
the trial judge's own racist judgment about the morality of interracial marriage, but a 
realistic appraisal of problems the child would face from racist hostility among members 
of the community. Although Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, acknowl-
edged that the trial judge intended to serve "the best interests of the child," id. at 433, 
he stated that the decree was founded on impermissible considerations: 
It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic prejudices do not exist 
or that all manifestations of those prejudices have been eliminated. There is a 
risk that a child living with a stepparent of a different race may be subject to a 
variety of pressures and stresses not present if the child were living with par-
ents of the same racial or ethnic origin. 
The question, however, is whether the reality of private biases and the pos-
sible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for removal of an 
infant child from the custody of its natural mother. We have little difficulty 
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pact as constitutionally si.knificant would require examining the extent 
to which harmful impact causes racism throughout society at large, 
rather than its significance from the perspective of the individual "inno-
cent white victim." Indeed, the Court would have to examine the inten-
sity of racist sentiments likely to be engendered (an empirical 
question), the number of people likely to have such sentiments (an em-
pirical question), and the relative importance of both triggering this la-
tent racism and leaving the effects of past racial discrimination intact (a 
normative question). 
Whether affirmative action programs actually promote or mitigate 
racism-in the short term and in the more distant future-is a debata-
ble matter that courts are not especially well equipped to resolve. In-
deed, in another context, Justice O'Connor cautioned that while 
"[p]olitical divisiveness is admittedly an evil addressed by the Establish-
ment Clause," "[g]uessing the potential for political divisiveness inher-
ent in a government practice is simply too speculative an enterprise."54 
Thus, she concluded that "political divisiveness along religious lines 
should not be an independent test of constitutionality."55 AJustice has 
no principled reason for feeling better equipped to predict potential 
political divisiveness resulting from affirmative action programs than to 
predict potential political divisiveness resulting from state associations 
with religion. 56 
Furthermore, judicial conservatives should see a similar incapacity 
to resolve the normative question. Whether it is worse to leave the ef-
fects of past racism intact, or to risk unleashin~ latent racism, is a ques-
concluding that they are not. The Constitution cannot control such prejudices, 
but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the 
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect. 
Id. The proposition that a state is constitutionally prohibited from considering the "re-
ality of private biases" in making child custody determinations, but is constitutionally 
required to consider this racism in creating affirmative action policies, is itself inconsis-
tent, and in no way helps to reconcile Davis and Wygant. 
54. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor,J., concurring). 
55. Id. Rather, "the constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the character 
of the government activity that might cause such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness 
its el£" Id. 
56. It hardly could be contended that the equal protection clause was originally 
intended to prohibit or disfavor governmental policies that foster divisiveness along ra-
cial lines. The clause itself was a product of war between factions of a nation deeply 
divided about racial issues. The North's vision of racial justice prevailed; political divi-
sion was an accepted cost of attaining that vision. See, e.g., M. Konvitz & T. Leskes, A 
Century of Civil Rights 51-52 (1961) (North imposed fourteenth amendment on unwill-
ing white Southern electorate); Call, The Fourteenth Amendment and Its Skeptical 
Background, 13 Baylor L. Rev. 1, 14 (1961); Chang, supra note 37, 828-30; Suthon, The 
Dubious Origin of the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 Tul. L. Rev. 22, 44 (1953). Indeed, if 
any legal decision promoted political division and racism, it was the Court's own inter-
pretation of the equal protection clause in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
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tion demanding political judgment.57 Indeed, a similar judicial 
incapacity to choose among competing permissible public concerns was 
a primary reason for the Court's rejection of harmful impact as consti-
tutionally irrelevant in Washington v. Davis.58 It is more than ironic that 
justice Scalia-perhaps the Court's strongest proponent of judicial 
conservatism in other contexts-is the Court's strongest proponent of 
invalidating racial classifications designed to redress effects of past ra-
cial discrimination on the ground that they might promote racial 
prejudice. 59 
llI. TRADITIONAL EQ..UTIY AND CoNSERVATIVEjusTicEs 
The analysis developed in Part II suggests that the Court's differ-
ent treatment of harmful impact in Wygant and Davis cannot be justified 
by the presence or absence of a racial classification. Neither the intent 
to discriminate based on race, the intent to discriminate because of 
race, the threat to human dignity, nor the prospect of promoting racism 
justifies an independent concern with the specific losses that individuals 
might suffer because a legislature has chosen to redress the effects of 
past racial discrimination.60 Another distinction between Davis and Wy-
57. One might argue that any statute or constitutional provision adopted to combat 
racist actions-such as the thirteenth amendment's abolition of slavery, the fourteenth 
amendment's equal protection clause, or the Civil Rights Act of 1964--could foment 
racial prejudice. Until legislatures began to adopt affirmative action programs, however, 
courts never considered whether the gains toward racial justice were worth ancillary 
impediments to racial justice. See, ·e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 
(1966) (showing deference to a congressional choice of means to serve the constitution-
ally permissible end of protecting from state intrusion the voting rights of citizens edu-
cated in Puerto Rico). 
58. See supra text at notes 22-25; infra text at notes 74-90. 
59. See supra note 52. Other members of the Court have expressed the related 
concern that affirmative action programs might "stigmatize" all members of the pre-
ferred racial and ethnic groups by reinforcing stereotypes. See, e.g., Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3028 (1990) (Stevens,J., concurring) ("racial or ethnic 
characteristics provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment only in extremely rare 
situations"); id. at 3029 (O'Connor,J., dissenting) ("Racial classifications ... may stig-
matize those groups singled out for different treatment .... "). Reasons for viewing the 
potential for fomenting racial animus as constitutionally irrelevant also apply to con-
cerns about fomenting racist stereotype. 
60. If there ever were a case in which the equities of harmful impact from a racial 
classification cried out for attention, it was in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944), in which the Court upheld orders barring Japanese-Americans from their places 
of residence and work. Justice Black, for the Court, seemed concerned exclusively with 
the issue of impermissible motivation. The government had, in the Court's view, ade-
quately "answer[ed] the contention that the exclusion was in the nature of group pun-
ishment based on antagonism to those of Japanese origin." Id. at 219. Responding to 
arguments that the exclusion policies harmed those affected, Justice Black seemed to 
view the equitable issue as constitutionally irrelevant: "[H]ardships are part of war, and 
war is an aggregation of hardships. . . . Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its 
privileges, and in time of war the burden is always heavier." Id. The reference to the 
general responsibilities of citizenship, as well as to specific responsibilities in time of 
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gant remains: the interests of blacks were harmed by traditional poli-
cies in the former case, while the interests of whites were harmed by 
evolving policies in the latter. This Part will suggest that the Justices 
responsible for the dichotomy between Wygant and Davis have, indeed, 
accorded special constitutional status to the interests of whites against 
affirmative action and, in so doing, have strayed far from their protesta-
tions of disinterested judicial conservatism to the antithetical practice of 
instrumental political conservatism. 
A. Wygant and Conservative Activism 
Conservative Justices essentially have created a conditional "fun-
damental right" to the distribution of benefits according to traditional 
criteria-a right triggered by a legislative policy to redress effects of 
past racial discrimination through racial classification. Justice Powell's 
proposition in Wygant that "innocent persons may be called upon to 
bear some of the burden" of curing the effects of past racial discrimina-
tion, but only if that burden is not "too intrusive"61 reflects an unstated 
premise that the displaced "innocent white victims" have a constitu-
tional claim to receive benefits denied them by affirmative action poli-
cies. With seniority comes special constitutional entitlement to keep a 
job.62 With a high grade point average comes special constitutional 
entitlement to a place in medical school.63 With a low bid comes spe-
cial constitutional entitlement to a government contract.64 By trying to 
war, suggests that Justice Black's view of "unfair" harmful impact as constitutionally 
irrelevant was not limited to a wartime context. Yet Justice Black's opinion can be 
faulted-and the dissenting Justices did so fault it-for failing to look carefully for racial 
animus or stereotype. Indeed, while he noted that "racial antagonism never can" be a 
permissible basis for government action, id. at 216, and that "[olur task would be simple 
... were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen ... because of racial 
prejudice," id. at 223,Justice Black never explicitly stated that the Constitution prohib-
its governmental action because of racial stereotype. But cf. id. at 226 (Roberts,J., dis-
senting) (case involves imprisonment of citizen "solely because of his ancestry, without 
evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty"); id. at 239-41 (Murphy,J., dissenting) (ac-
tion based on erroneous assumptions of correlation between race and disloyalty); id. at 
242 ("I dissent ... from this legalization of racism."). 
61. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 281, 283 (1986) (plurality 
opinion). 
62. See id. 
63. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (plurality 
opinion) (denying opportunity to attend medical school to applicant with higher grades 
to benefit another with lower grades, based on race, presents "serious problems of 
justice"). 
64. See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 730 (1989) (plurality 
opinion). When the Court held that "disproportionately harmful impact" lacks intrinsic 
constitutional significance, minority litigants pursued a litigation strategy of carving out 
special substantive rights-e.g., housing, welfare, education-to which the Court re-
sponded unsympathetically. See Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Be-
yond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. Ill. L.F. 961, 965 
(1977). Advocates of judicial conservatism have criticized this quest for "due sub-
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balance the measure of entitlement against the competing state interest 
in ameliorating the effects of past racial discrimination, the Wygant ma-
jority decided whether the burden imposed by the affirmative action 
program on "innocent white victims" is constitutionally excessive.65 
As a matter_ of tradition, society has valued seniority more than in-
experience, higher grade point averages more than lower, and low bids 
more than high. Because legislatures and juries reflect community sen-
timent, these values traditionally have been bases for statutory and 
common-law entitlements. More recently, by adopting affirmative ac-
tion programs to redress the effects of past racial discrimination, legis-
latures have signalled an evolution in prevailing public values. While 
seniority remains politically important, the people's representatives 
sometimes wish it displaced somewhat toward ,eradicating the legacy of 
past racial discrimination from American society;66 so with high grade 
point averages,67 low bids,68 and other traditional criteria for distribut-
ing public goods. 
Thus, affirmative action programs designed to redress the effects 
of past societal discrimination create new statutory rights based on new 
social values that displace traditional statutory rights (or common law 
rights effective through legislative sufferance) based on traditional so-
cial values. The foundation for these new legal rights is the same as the 
foundation underlying displaced traditional legal rights: majoritarian 
values as reflected in legislative choice. No one would argne that legis-
latures are, as a general matter, constitutionally prohibited from repeal-
ing, modifying, or displacing old statutory or common law rules simply 
because those rules are traditional. But if tradition is not constitution-
ally mandated as a general matter, then one must either pick and 
choose which traditional rules are to be deemed constitutionally man-
dated, and which are not, or one must reject tradition per se as a basis 
for creating constitutional meaning. Without a constitutionally rooted 
or presently uncontroversial basis by which to choose among tradi-
tional policies to be preserved in the face of evolving social values, and 
those to be sacrificed, the true judicial conservative must leave issues 
for legislatures-and, ultimately, for voters-to decide.69 Neither the 
stance." See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 2, at 356--60. Yet, this is precisely what the 
conservative Court has done for "innocent white victims" of affirmative action. 
65. Justice Marshall recognized this point with respect to seniority. See Wygant, 
476 U.S. at 307-08 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Rather than argue that these questions of 
social equity should not be resolved by Justices, however, Justice Marshall argued the 
definition of equity. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
66. See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 272. 
67. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-19. 
68. See, e.g., Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 713; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 468-69 
(1980). 
69. Indeed, judicial conservatives have rejected as beyond the judicial role the con-
stitutionalization in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), ofa then-traditional free-
dom to pursue then-traditional practices between employers and employees. See, e.g., 
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original understanding of the equal protection clause about racial clas-
sifications and principles of racial justice, 70 nor contemporary political 
consensus, 71 provides the necessary basis for the judicial conservative 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
784 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In striking down a law that set a maximum 
number of hours on the workday of certain workers, the Lochner Court created a consti· 
tutional "right of free contract" specially protected from legislative intrusion. Lochner, 
198 U.S. at 64. The Court later retreated from this position, saying that "a state is free 
to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public wel· 
fare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose." Nebbia v. New 
York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). The Court retreated in part because the Lochner doc-
trine was rejected by prevailing public values-Congress itself adopted policies like 
those invalidated in Lochner-and also because its interpretive methodology was rejected 
by prevailing standards of scholarship. See, e.g., Bickle, Judicial Determination of 
Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitntional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 Harv. L. 
Rev. 6, 8-13 (1924) (criticizing Lochner for invalidating legislation based on factual 
premises not supported by evidence in the record); id. at 17 (criticizing Supreme Court 
invalidation of statutes because "its ideas of public policy differ from those of the legisla· 
ture"); Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 
7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 151 (1893) (advocating judicial deference to legislative judgment 
unless challenged policy is "beyond a reasonable doubt" unconstitutional); see also Fer-
guson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("[w]e have returned to the original constitu· 
tional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the 
judgment[s] oflegislative bodies"). One might view today's conditional "fundamental" 
right to traditional selection criteria as an unacknowledged resurrection of economic 
rights in the Constitution. True, these economic rights are not triggered unless the state 
pursues permissible objectives through racial means, but they are economic rights none-
theless. As Justice Powell stated in Wygant: "The Constitution does not require layoffs 
to be based on strict seniority. But it does require the State to m.eet a heavy burden of 
justification when it implements a layoff plan based on race." 476 U.S. at 282 n.10. 
Some even reject Griswold's constitutionalization of the freedom to pursue tradi· 
tional conjugal practices between husband and wife. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 522-23 (Black,J., dissenting) (critically equating Griswold with Lochner); R. 
Bork, supra note 1, at 95 (calling Griswold a "Constitutional Time Bomb"); id. at 120 n.• 
("the right of privacy cases rest upon no constitutional principle, but are ... merejudi· 
cial ukases"); id. at 169 (Griswold created a new constitutional principle by "tour de 
force"); Bork, At Last, an End to Supreme Court Activism, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1990, at 
A21, col. 5 ("The 'right to privacy' ... was invented in Griswold" throughjudicial "leg-
islating"). But at least from the perspective of judicial conservatism based on "conven· 
tional morality," see supra note 6, Griswold is more supportable than is either Lochner or 
Wygant. The norm enforced in Griswold reflected not only tradition, but also a contem· 
porary national consensus about marital morality. See Chang, supra note 37, at 819-23. 
The norms enforced in Lochner and Wygant contravened contemporary national morality 
as reflected in congressional and state legislative choices. See infra note 71 and accom-
panying text. 
70. See supra notes 37, 56; infra note 146. 
71. A judicial conservative who refers to "conventional morality" as a source for 
constitutional values, see supra note 6, would find difficulty in thwarting legislative dis· 
cretion to balance competing equities in the context of affirmative action. A "conven-
tional morality" basis for invalidating state policies as unconstitutional requires a 
national consensus that those local policies are "wrong." There is no such consensus in 
the United States about affirmative action. To the contrary, the prevalence ofaffirmative 
action programs suggests consensus that there is, in fact, some measure of moral re· 
sponsibility to redress effects of past racial discrimination. Furthermore, even if there 
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to determine that one or another permissibly motivated effort to reallo-
cate the effects of past racial discrimination is constitutionally prohib-
ited. It is revealing that neither Justice Rehnquist, nor Justice 
O'Connor, nor Justice Scalia, nor Justice Kennedy has ever attempted 
to justify a concern with discriminatory impact on "innocent" whites as 
derived from originalism, "conventional morality," or any other philos-
ophy of constitutional interpretation. 
Yet like the white police officer with whom this Article began, some 
might argue that when the quest to ameliorate the effects of society's 
past racial discrimination displaces traditional rights based on seniority, 
high grade point averages, and low bids, the government's policy "un-
fairly" frustrates the settled expectations of "innocent white victims"-
and is unconstitutional because "unfair."72 But settled expectations do 
not constitutionally prohibit states from laying off workers because of 
economic need-or from boosting income tax rates, eliminating tax de-
ductions for interest payments, or dosing or moving elementary 
schools-despite the critical personal decisions that individuals might 
have made in reliance on those established policies. From the perspec-
tive of a judicial conservative, why should settled expectations be 
treated differently when the government pursues permissible ends by 
nonracial means than when it pursues permissible ends by racial 
means?78 
Furthermore, against this notion of "fairness" others can claim 
that settled expectations rest upon an unjust foundation. For black ap-
plicants whose accomplishments-in attaining grade point averages, 
gettingjobs, earning seniority-have been stunted by the effects of past 
racial discrimination, persistent use of these selection criteria serves 
settled expectations of unfairness and, perhaps, a settled psychology of 
despair. Thus, like the black police applicant with whom this Article 
began, many might argue that traditional criteria for distributing public 
goods are unfair-and unconstitutional because unfair. 
Most importantly, making constitutional law based on ungrounded 
and deeply contestable claims about fairness is antithetical to the judi-
were a national consensus that affirmative action is morally problematic because of ef-
fects suffered by "innocent white victims," "conventional morality" requires additional 
consensus that states and localities should be precluded from pursuing their own prefer-
ences. Such a consensus does not exist. Indeed, Congress (the best available indicator of 
national political consensus) created the pattern from which Richmond borrowed in the 
Croson case. See infra text at notes 120-121, 146. For further analysis of"conventional 
morality" as a basis for constitutional adjudication, see Chang, supra note 37, at 
799-805, 819-23. 
72. As Justice Powell stated in Wygant, "[a] worker may invest many productive 
years in one job and one city with the expectation of earning the stability and security of 
seniority .... Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations .... " Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of 
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
73. See supra text at notes 52-59 (promoting racial prejudice is inadequate justifi-
cation for distinguishing different treatment of harmful impact in Davis and Wygant). 
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cial conservative's professed philosophy.74 Indeed, it was precisely be-
cause the Davis Court was unwilling to make these ad hoc judgments of 
fairness when blacks were disproportionately harmed by traditional 
policies pursuing permissible state purposes that it refused to second 
guess the legislature's equitable balance. Again, Justice White noted: 
A rule that a statute desigued to serve neutral ends is never-
theless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it 
benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far 
reaching and would raise serious questions about, and per-
haps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, 
regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burden-
some to the poor and to the average black than to the more 
affluent white .... 
. . . [l]n our view, extension of the rule beyond those areas 
where it is already applicable by reason of statute, such as in 
the field of public employment, should await legislative 
prescription. 75 
Thus, under Davis, Congress could permit or require seniority rights 
against layoff as a matter of statutory law, despite the disproportion-
ately harmful effect of this policy on blacks.76 The Davis Court would 
have refused to intervene because the relevant questions of equity in-
volved political rather than judicial judgment. 
Although Justice White did not devote detailed attention to the 
factors that should inform this political judgment, Professor Michael 
Perry has. 77 Arguing that the Davis Court should have held that harm-
ful impact disproportionately suffered by blacks should be deemed to 
have intrinsic constitutional significance, Perry notes, first, the signifi-
cance of disproportion. Given centuries of public and private racial dis-
crimination, Perry concludes that "[t]he underlying cause of 
disproportionate racial impact, the especially disadvantaged social posi-
tion of black Americans, is one for which American society and govern-
ment bear a heavy moral responsibility."78 
74. Justice Marshall, himself accused of following a result-oriented approach to 
constitutional interpretation, see, e.g., Barber, The New Right Assault on Moral Inquiry 
in Constitutional Law, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 253, 277-78 (1986), levied such a charge 
against the Court in Wygant: "I, too, believe that layoffs are unfair. But unfairness ought 
not be confused with constitutional injury." 476 U.S. at 296 (Marshall,]., dissenting). 
75. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248; see also Note, supra note 41, at 1383 (Davis rested on 
need to separate judicial from legislative functions). 
76. Congress did so in § 703(h) of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988) 
(despite presumptive invalidity under Title Vil of general employment practices having 
a racially discriminatory impact, standards for compensation, seniority, or merit that 
have such an impact but that "are not the result of an intention to discriminate because 
of race" are not unlawful employment practices). In Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 
v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 577-78 (1984), the Court upheld this provision. 
77. See Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, I25 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 540 (1977). 
78. Id. at 558; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co. 109 S. Ct. 706, 724 
(1989) (plurality opinion) ("there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and 
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Next, Perry lists four factors relevant for determining how society 
should discharge its "moral responsibility" for ameliorating the effects 
of past injustice: 
In determining whether a disproportionate disadvantage is 
justified, a court would weigh several factors: (1) the degree of 
disproportion in the impact; (2) the private interest disadvan-
taged; (3) the efficiency of the challenged law in achieving its 
objective and the availability of alternative means having a less 
disproportionate impact; and (4) the government objective 
sought to be advanced. 79 
In the context of public employment, Perry finas these factors roughly 
balanced unless a challenged employment policy does not bear "a de-
monstrable relation to job performance."80 He claims that while his 
approach to discriminatory impact is flexible, "a claim based on dispro-
portionate racial impact, as a practical matter, can exist in only a limited 
number of contexts and can succeed in even fewer."81 Thus, in Perry's 
view, Justice White was wrong to fear that recognizing Davis's claim 
"would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate"82 a 
broad range of statutes.88 
Yet Perry's dissection of a putative constitutional concern with 
harmful impact caused by traditional, and otherwise permissible, crite-
ria for distributing public goods cannot dispel Justice White's concern, 
rooted injudicial conservatism, about the limits of judicial capacity and 
the prerogatives of legislative discretion. While the amount of dispro-
portionate impact might well be quantifiable, its moral significance-
the force of society's "moral responsibility" to rectify84 the harm 
done-is not. Similarly, assessing the importance of the "private inter-
est disadvantaged" requires the exercise of personally idiosyncratic 
judgment that a judicial conservative would rather not impose on con-
trary legislative choices. Searching for "alternative means having less 
disproportionate impact" involves relatively quantifiable judgment that 
a judicial conservative might comfortably make, but evaluating any loss 
of "efficiency of the challenged law in achieving its objective" does 
not.85 Finally, evaluating the merits of "the government interest 
public discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for 
black[s]"). 
79. See Perry, supra note 77, at 560 (footnotes omitted). 
80. Id. at 572. 
81. Id. at 563. 
82. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). 
83. See Perry, supra note 77, at 563, 586-89. But see Eisenberg, Disproportionate 
Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
36, 46 (1977). 
84. Perry, supra note 77, at 558. 
85. While a requirement of '1ob-relatedness" might seem obvious to Perry, id. at 
571-73, it is less clear to me that this inevitably is the·proper place to strike the balance 
between the "moral obligation" to redress effects of past racial discrimination and per-
missible competing policies that might compound those effects. If, for example, the 
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sought to be advanced" is not a question that a judicial conservative 
would pose.86 
Thus, although·he did not analyze Davis's claim as closely as did 
Professor Perry, Justice White was quite correct-at least from the per-
spective of judicial conservatism-that concern with harmful impact 
disproportionately suffered by blacks should be resolved not by courts, 
but by "legislative prescription."87 Indeed, the factors that Perry iden-
tified-the factors that Justice White in Davis implicitly held to be mat-
ters for legislative judgment-are precisely the factors that legislatures 
do balance when designing affirmative attion programs that inevitably 
harm the interests of "innocent white victims": the importance of "our 
moral obligation" to redress effects of past racial discrimination, the 
extent to which such effects are felt in different contexts, the impor-
tance of competing private interests that would be disadvantaged, how 
well traditional criteria for distributing public goods serve competing 
public ends, and the importance of those competing public ends.88 
definition of 'job-relatedness" for a police officer is catching criminals, some might ar-
gue that it is worth forgoing the capture of one (or two, or three, or even more) 
criminals in order to help discharge society's moral obligation to redress the effects of 
past racial discrimination. Furthermore, the definition of "required job performance" 
itself requires contestable judgments. One community might want all of its police of-
ficers to have enough educational background and achievement to rival the learned criti-
cal capacity of Sherlock Holmes. Another community might want its police force simply 
to patrol the streets as a deterrent presence. These two ways of defining the 'job" each 
relate differently to effects of past racial discrimination and, therefore, likely would have 
different disproportionate impacts. Thus, without being able to control the definition of 
a 'job," the criterion of'job-relatedness" must be toothless. But in order to control the 
definition ofa 'job," ajudge must make precisely the sort of policy judgment that Jus-
tice White in Davis deems appropriate not for courts, but for "legislative prescription." 
Davis, 426 U.S. at 248. 
86. See supra note 85. Similar problems are evident in the context of educational 
segregation, for which Perry counsels judicial invalidation of policies serving permissible 
purposes, if they have the effect of perpetuating segregation, in favor of "action condu-
cive to racial balance ... if practical under the circumstances." Perry, supra note 77, at 
575-76. Clearly, determining what is "practical under the circumstances" requires judg-
ments about expenditures, funding, alternatives, and priorities-again, matters that the 
judicial conservative would view as properly being within legislative purview. See also 
id. at 584 n.192 (advocating invalidation of land use policies disproportionately harming 
blacks unless doing so would "intrude seriously on [government's] fiscal or environmen-
tal interests"). 
87. Davis, 426 U.S. at 246-48. 
88. See id. at 248. In determining that his "flexible" approach would not apply to 
regressive measures such as sales taxes or fees for public goods, Perry notes that "[t]he 
public fisc is not inexhaustible. An individual's interest in receiving, for nothing or at 
reduced cost, goods or services that carry a price tag ... is not substantial." Perry, supra 
note 77, at 564. Yet surely such measures also disproportionately harm blacks because 
of past racial discrimination. Why does the "moral obligation" to redress those effects 
not extend to requiring lower (if not zero) fees for blacks? Cf. B. Bittker, The Case for 
Black Reparations 8-29 (1973) (arguing for a legislative policy of black reparations). 
Why does the obligation extend to invalidate land use policies that have a disproportion-
ate impact on blacks, if the invalidation does not "intrude seriously" on government's 
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A true judicial conservative does not displace one legislature's 
choices by acting as if her court were another legislature with different 
priorities. Yet the Supreme Court's treatment of harmful impact in 
Wygant displaces present legislative preferences with values derived not 
from constitutional text or history, but from the personal values of jus-
tices who prefer traditional legislative judgments and business prac-
tices. 89 Consistent distrust of judicial P<?licymaking should counsel 
judges not to second guess a legislature's equitable balance not only 
when it pursues permissible objectives that disproportionately harm 
blacks, but also when it pursues permissible objectives that dispropor-
tionately harin whites.90 From the perspective of a true judicial con-
servative, Wygant should have disclaimed an independent constitutional 
concern with discriminatory impact just as Davis did. 
B. Why Do Liberal Dissenters Play the Conservatives' Game? 
Rather than argue that traditional values such as seniority, low 
bids, or high scores should have no special protection against displace-
ment by competing permissible state interests, justice Marshall, joined 
"fiscal or environmental interests?" Perry, supra note 77, at 584 n.192. Determining 
that the public fisc is more important when dealing with fees and taxes than with zoning, 
and that the individual interest in obtaining goods that require fees is less important 
than in obtaining goods that require zoning, is not a matter of inexorable logic. Cf. infra 
text at notes 112-115 (discussing justice Stevens's argument that state has more discre-
tion to tax and spend than to reallocate jobs toward redressing effects of past racial 
discrimination). These determinations require the exercise of practical and moraljudg-
ment, which depends on each individual's personal values. For the judicial conservative, 
these determinations are for legislatures, not courts. 
89. Indeed, one might question the extent to which legal enforcement of "merit" 
criteria is traditional. An employee's legal rights against the employer's whim is a rela-
tively recent development; at common law, the "employment at will" doctrine gave em-
ployees virtually no rights and employers virtually full discretion. See, e.g., Leonard, A 
New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C.L. Rev. 631, 632 (1988). 
90. To the extent that constitutionalism seeks to ensure that public policy reflects 
well considered judgments about competing social concerns, see, e.g., A. Bickel, The 
Least Dangerous Branch 111-98 (1962) (advocating "passive virtues" in judicial re-
view); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale LJ. 1013 
(1984); Chang, supra note 37, at 767-74 (constitutionalism as aspiration for political 
self-constraint); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale LJ. 1539 (1988), 
there is reason to be more concerned about a Daw-type policy that disproportionately 
harms blacks than a Wygant-type policy that disproportionately harms whites. Daw-type 
policies are legion, while Wygant-type policies are selected for specific contexts. Daw-
type policies govern by default, while Wygant-type policies require political energy to-
ward making affirmative decisions against both inertia and the grain of tradition. Thus, 
if the Court wishes to ensure that legislatures pay adequate attention to the interests of 
those victimized by permissible policies that disproportionately harm the interests of 
different racial groups, there is more reason to interfere with a facially neutral policy 
that disproportionately harms blacks than with a racial classification that disproportion-
ately harms whites. In short, at least toward ensuring considered judgment, there was 
more reason for the Court to intervene in Davir than in Wygant in an attempt to ensure 
·~ustice" for "innocent victims" of programs serving permissible state purposes. 
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by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, has argued that the goal of re-
dressing the effects of past racial discrimination "is of sufficient impor-
tance to justify" displacing such traditional policies and the settled 
expectations of white employees.91 Thus, in concluding that the layoff 
provision in Wygant was permissible, Justice Marshall balanced interests 
and equities: 
Article XII is a narrow provision because it allocates the 
impact of an unavoidable burden proportionately between two 
racial groups. It places no absolute burden or benefit on one 
race, and, within the confines of constant minority propor-
tions, it preserves the hierarchy of seniority in the selection of 
individuals for layoff. . . . Moreover, Article XII does not use 
layoff protection as a tool for increasing minority representa-
tion; achievement of that goal is entrusted to the less severe 
hiring process. . . . In all of these important ways, Article XII 
metes out the hardship of layoffs in a manner that achieves its 
purpose with the smallest possible deviation from established 
norms.92 
Justice Marshall implicitly acknowledged here that an affirmative action 
program could be invalid if, in his view, hardships are not equitably dis-
tributed. 98 Thus, the liberal dissenters endorse the proposition that it 
is legitimate for members of the Court to make judgments about 
whether the effects of past racial discrimination have been "fairly11 
allocated. 94 
In one sense, thi~ should hardly be surprising. These liberal Jus-
91. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 305-10 (1986) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
92. Id. at 309-10 (footnote omitted). 
93. Justice Brennan pursued a similar course in the Metro Broadcasting challenge to a 
Federal Communications Commission policy preferring minority applicants for broad-
casting licensing rights. He held that the burden on "innocent" nonminorities was 
"slight" and, therefore, constitutionally permissible. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. 
FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3026 (1990). 
94. Indeed, Justice Marshall noted in Wygant that "[a]ny per se prohibition against 
layoff protection ... must rest upon a premise that the tradition of basing layoff deci-
sions on seniority is so fundamental that its modification can never be permitted." 476 
U.S. at 307-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Rather than argue that there should be no 
special constitutional entitlement to the distribution of public goods based on these 
traditional criteria, however, he argued that "protection from layoff is not altogether 
unavailable as a tool for achieving legitimate societal goals." Id. at 309. Thus, in up-
holding a racial classification in the distribution of FCC broadcast licenses, the Court's 
liberal wing (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) along with two swing voters 
(Justices White and Stevens) explicitly stated that "a congressionally mandated benigu 
race-conscious program that is substantially related to the achievement of an important 
governmental interest is consistent with equal protection principles so long as it does 
not impose undue burdens on nonminorities." Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3026. In 
Metro Broadcasting, the Court found that "the burden on nonminorities is slight." Id. 
Thus, even for the liberals, harmful impact on "innocent white victims" is constitution-
ally relevant, apart from whether the government has acted because of impermissible 
purpose. 
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tices have never claimed to be judicial conservatives. They habitually 
make constitutional law by balancing social equities.95 Thus, it is not so 
much that the liberal dissenters are playing the conservatives' game as 
that the conservatives have, in the context of affirmative action, degen-
erated from judicial conservatives into conservative judicial activists.96 
While the conservatives' approach itself reflects ad hoc, personal 
rejections of majoritarian choices, the liberals simply have sought to 
uphold legislative determinations about how to allocate the effects of 
past racial discrimination among innocent parties. Thus, given the 
Court's determination in Davis that these questions of social equity are 
for legislators, not judges, the liberal wing of the Court need not have 
relied on their own assertions about racial equity to validate an affirma-
tive action program. Rather than debate about "fairness,"97 the liberal 
dissenters should have confronted the self-proclaimed 'judicial con-
servatives" with the premises of judicial conservatism: Legislative dis-
cretion is the most fundamental of all constitutional values and should 
not be limited by a judge's personal preferences.98 
95. Liberal academics often follow a similar course. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra 
note 8, at 1770 (arguing equities of distributing harm among different innocent victims 
without distinguishing constitutional from philosophical argument); id. at 1790 (arguing 
that affirmative action designed to redress effects of past discrimination imposes accept-
able burden on "innocent white victims"). 
96. Further evidence of this conservative judicial activism is provided by Professor 
Ortiz's examination of how the Court has allocated burdens of proof in resolving differ-
ent claims of unconstitutional discrimination when the government acts through facially-
neutral means. Ortiz asserts a pattern in which the Court has made it more difficult to 
prove unconstitutional motivation when the effect of the discrimination-the interest de-
nied-involves" 'ordinary' social and economic goods, like jobs and housing,'' and eas-
ier to prove impermissible intent when the interest denied "consists of political, 
criminal, and educational rights." See Ortiz, supra note 9, at 1141. He explains the 
pattern: 
In prescribing the burdens borne by the parties, the intent doctrine thus re-
flects both of the core features of liberalism: the aggressive protection of those 
rights and liberties that enable the individual to pursue her own vision of the 
good and the permissive supervision of government intervention in traditional 
economic and social markets. 
Id. at 1142. The principle oflegislative discretion when the private interests involved 
are economic-a principle evident in Davis itself- is clearly contravened in Wygant. 
Although the same economic interests are involved, and although the Court is especially 
deferential to legislative discretion when the equitable challenge is from the traditionally 
dispossessed, the Court's conservative Justices willingly intervene, based on their own 
views, when the equitable challenge is from those favored by the displaced economic 
criteria. 
97. Cf. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986) (sug-
gesting Supreme Court as a legislature of nine people). 
98. Ironically, Justice O'Connor faults Justice Brennan and the liberals for making 
subjective determinations about whether or not a racial classification imposes permissi-
ble burdens on "innocent white victims": 
Untethered to narrowly confined remedial notions, "benign" carries with it no 
independent meaning, but reflects only acceptance of the current generation's 
conclusion that a politically acceptable burden, imposed on particular citizens 
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As a frequent swing vote, Justice Stevens personifies a Court that 
easily displaces legislative policy with ad hoc judgments by each and 
every Justice. In Wygant, he gave his version of the relevant judicial 
question: 
I believe that we should first ask whether the [government's] 
action advances the public interest . . . . If so, I believe we 
should consider whether that public interest, and the manner 
in which it is pursued, justifies any adverse effects on the dis-
advantaged group.99 
Clearly, this is not a judicial conservative's question.1°0 Identifying the 
"public interest" is a question not of constitutional interpretation, but 
of debatable social policy. Similarly, whether any permissibly moti-
vated vision of the public interest justifies its adverse effects on groups 
is not a question for judicial conservatives-and not a question for Jus-
tices who adhere consistently to Davis-but for the electorate.101 
The liberal Justices cannot change the instinctive values and policy 
preferences of their conservative colleagues. Debate about racial 
equity within the Court, therefore, cannot be productive.102 Calling for 
on the basis of race, is reasonable. The Court provides no basis for determin-
ing when a racial classification fails to be "benevolent." 
Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3033 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Although justice 
O'Connor might place the fulcrum of her balance where it will favor traditional more 
than remedial values, she and her conservative colleagues also fail to provide constitu-
tionally rooted criteria to determine when the impact on "innocent white victims" is 
acceptable, and when not. · 
99. Wygant v.jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313 (1986) (Stevens,j., dissent-
ing) (footnote omitted). 
100. justice Stevens's departure from Davis is even more clear in the following 
statement: "Even if there is a valid purpose to the race consciousness, however, the 
question that remains is whether that public purpose transcends the harm to the white 
teachers who are disadvantaged by the special preference the Board has given to its 
· most recently hired minority teachers." ld. at 317. 
101. That justice Stevens-as well as every other member of the Court-is making 
precisely these politicaljudgments in the name of"constitutional law" is highlighted by 
the pattern of his decisions. In his Wygant dissent, he described the burden on "inno-
cent white victims" as being outweighed by the "public interest" served in insulating 
minority teachers with less seniority from layoffs. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 317-19 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). In Croson, a goal of redressing the effects of past racial discrimination did 
not justify burdening white contractors with the loss of business to which their lower 
bids otherwise entitled them. City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 733 
(1989) (Stevens,J., concurring). And in Metro Broadcasting, he implicitly found that any 
adverse impact on whites who otherwise might have received broadcast licenses from 
the FCC was outweighed by "[t]he public interest in broadcast diversity." Indeed, Ste-
vens did not even mention harmful impact as a potential counterweight to the "unques-
tionably legitimate" interest in broadcast diversity. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3028 
(Stevens, J., concurring). These judgments are in no way guided by any notion of con-
stitutional interpretation other than reference to a judge's personal values. 
102. In Metro Broadcasting, for example, justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens concluded that the burden on "nonminorities" was "slight." 110 S. 
Ct. at 3026. justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, however, determined that the 
challenged racial preferences imposed a "particularly significant burden" on "individu-
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a consistent posture of judicial conservatism from those who claim to 
be judicial conservatives, however, might well be more effective. It is 
also the right thiug to do. 
IV. TOWARD AJUDICIAL CONSERVATIVE'S APPROACH TO RACIAL 
CLASSIFICATIONS 
This Part considers from the perspective of a judicial conservative 
methods for determining whether the government has adopted an af-
firmative action program because of impermissible racial animus, favor-
itism, or stereotype. Part A examines doctrines for identifying 
impermissible purposes developed in City of Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co. 
Part B proposes an alternative approach employing five principles that 
can serve the judicial conservative' s dual goals of enforcing firmly es-
tablished constitutional values while not intruding on valid democratic 
discretion. 
A. Croson and Conservative justices 
In City of Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 1o3 the Court's self-proclaimed 
judicial conservatives voted to invalidate a municipal policy requiring 
prime construction contractors to subcontract at least thirty percent of 
their contract dollars to "Minority Business Enterprises."104 The pri-
mary basis for invalidation was a finding that Richmond had not pur-
sued a constitutionally permissible purpose. Rather than holding that 
Richmond had acted because of impermissible racism, however, Jus-
tices Scalia, Kennedy, Stevens, and O'Connor each restrictively defined 
the circumstances under which the purpose of redressing the effects of 
past racial discrimination would be deemed permissible. 
A search for impermissible purpose is consistent with Davis and its 
underlying judicial conservatism. The Croson Court's restrictive deter-
mination of when redressing the effects of past racial discrimination 
would be deemed a permissible purpose, however, is inconsistent with 
judicial conservatism. Indeed, as the following sections will suggest, 
the attitude underlying the Court's inconsistent treatment of harmful 
impact in Davis and Wygant also drives Croson's restrictive definition of 
when a purpose to redress the effects of past racial discrimination is 
permissible. 
1. justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Stevens: Racial Classifications May Be 
Used to Remedy Only judicially Provable Incidents of Illegal State Action. -
Justice Scalia recognized "only one circumstance in which the states 
may act by race to 'undo the effects of past discrimination': where that is 
necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful ra-
als who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups." Id. at 3043 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
103. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). 
104. Id. at 713-14. 
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cial classification."105 He elaborated: 
[A] State may "undo the effects of past racial discrimination' in 
the sense of giving the identified victim of state discrimina-
tion" that which it wrongfully denied him-for example, giv-
ing to ~ previously rejected black applicant the job that, by 
reason of discrimination, had been awarded to a white appli-
cant, even if this means terminating the latter's employment. 
In such a context, the white jobholder is not being selected for 
disadvantageous treatment because of his race, but because he 
was wrongfully awarded a job to which another is entitled. 
That is worlds apart from the system here, in which those to 
be disadvantaged are identified solely by race.1os 
Injustice Kennedy's view, putatively restating Justice Scalia's, "all pref-
erences which are not necessary remedies to victims of unlawful dis-
crimination" are impermissible.101 
A generalized goal of compensating for the effects of past racial 
discrimination does not necessarily reflect racial prejudice and, there-
fore, is not impermissible per se.108 Indeed, when a legislature em-
ploys a racial classification to redress broadly-spread effects of broadly-
based racial discrimination by society-at-large, it chooses to award a 
public benefit to a black person not because of his race, but because of 
a certain probability that doing so can help to correct these continuing 
effects. Thus, to paraphrase Justice Scalia's statement above, the white 
job holder is being selected for disadvantage not because of his race, 
but because doing so, better than not doing so, can help redress the 
broadly-based and broadly-spread effects of past racial discrimination. 
105. Id. at 737 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
106. Id. at 738 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
107. Id. at 734 (Kennedy,J., concurring). 
108. Based on statistics and history, communities might make empirical judgments 
about the likelihood that pervasive societal discrimination is responsible for the gross 
underrepresentation of blacks as builders, teachers, doctors, or lawyers. While these 
judgments might not rest on incontrovertible proof, they are based on credible evidence 
rather than unexamined stereotypes. Indeed, given inevitably limited knowledge, a gen-
eral statistical and historical study might be the best that a policymaker realistically can 
do to identify the effects of past racial discrimination. See infra text at notes 133-138, 
166-171. 
Furthermore, communities might make a normative judgment that allowing the 
probable effects of past injustice to persist would be such a present injustice that tradi-
tional criteria for distributing social goods should be displaced. This judgment is not 
based on racial animus or favoritism. There is no sense that one race is better than 
another. Rather, one principle of social justice (a certain probability that by giving a 
public good to one individual rather than another, the effects of past racial discrimina-
tion will be ameliorated) displaces another principle of social justice (a certain 
probability that by giving that same public good to one individual rather than another, a 
building will be constructed more cheaply or a job will be done more effectively). In-
deed, Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, White, and Stevens impose upon Richmond 
their own notion that the community's values are not sufficiently important either to 
displace traditional criteria for distributing public goods or to justify the disadvantage 
felt by white jobholders. See supra text at notes 61-90. 
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Under the Scalia-Kennedy position, however, legislatures are con-
stitutionally prohibited from determining that redressing the broadly-
spread effects of past racial discrimination by society-at-large is suffi-
ciently important to justify displacing seniority, high scores, and low 
bids-themselves only imperfect predictors of job performance-with 
affirmative action programs.109 Only the specific effects of specific past 
illegal discrimination committed by a particular governmental jurisdic-
tion are, for Justices Scalia and Kennedy, sufficiently important to war-
rant that jurisdiction's choice to adopt affirmative action programs to 
transfer benefits that "innocent white victims" would otherwise have 
received. 
By so disabling legislatures from balancing equitable concerns as 
they see fit, the Scalia-Kennedy position imposes as governing law a 
judge's personal views about the fairness of individual benefits gained 
from otherwise permissible competing public objectives. Ajustice who 
weighs the equities of harmful impact underlying otherwise permissible 
legislative goals does precisely what the Court refused to do in Davis: 
'judicial legislation" antithetical to judicial conservatism.110 Thus, the 
109. Indeed, to the extent that the Scalia-Kennedy position views racial classifica-
tions as valid only when used to provide remedies for victims of illegal discrimination, it 
holds that seniority, high scores, and low bids may never be displaced as criteria for 
distributing public goods. Only when the white job holder would not have gotten or 
retained her job but for illegal racial discrimination-and, therefore, probably was not 
the most senior employee, the high test scorer, or low price bidder-may she be disad-
vantaged for the sake of the state's remedial policies. Otherwise, the white job holder 
attained her position "fairly," under traditional selection criteria, and may not be 
harmed by a less particularized effon to redress the effects of past racial discrimination. 
110. See supra text at notes 61-90. Indeed, in another context, Justice Scalia re-
cently expressed the judicial conservative's discomfon with balancing the imponance of 
permissible state objectives against a harmful impact on religious practice in 
Employment Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). He speculated 
that this balancing could unleash a "parade of horribles" similar to those feared by Jus-
tice White in Davis. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. Scalia said: 
the purpose of our parade ... is not to suggest that couns would necessarily 
permit harmful exemptions from these laws [burdening religious practice] 
(though they might), but to suggest that couns would constantly be in the busi-
ness of determining whether the 'severe impact' of various laws on religious 
practice . . . suffices to permit us to confer an exemption. It is a parade of 
horribles because it is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly 
balance against the importance of general laws the significance of religious 
practice. 
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606 n.5. Thus, Scalia concluded that a free exercise claim is estab-
lished only if a claimant can prove an impermissible discriminatory motive. See id. at 
1600; cf. Sherwin, Rhetorical Pluralism and the Discourse Ideal: Countering Division of 
Employment v. Smith, A Parable of Pagans, Politics, and Majoritarian Rule, 85 Nw. U.L. 
Rev. 388, 417-39 (discussing implications ofCoun's refusal to balance in Smith). Thus, 
for a well-established textual right to religious free exercise, Justice Stalia would ignore 
impact. For a controversial, nontextual right to jobs and other public goods based on 
traditional selection criteria, Justice Scalia views impact as potentially dispositive, and 
would balance bis perception of the competing equities. 
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Scalia-Kennedy position in Croson reflects the same attitude of con-
servative judicial activism underlying the Court's inconsistent treat-
ment of harmful impact in Davis and Wygant-an impulse to protect 
traditional criteria for the distribution of public goods. 
Furthermore, while the Scalia-Kennedy position is appropriate for 
limiting federal judicial authority-a federal court may redistribute pub-
lic goods only upon a finding of illegality-considerations circumscrib-
ing judicial authority have no bearing on legislative discretion to define 
criteria for entitlement to public goods. Indeed, because principles 
limiting the remedial authority of federal courts have been designed to 
preserve legislative discretion, their application to limit legislative dis-
cretion could hardly be more perverse.111 
Justice Stevens's view of when governments may use racial classifi-
cations to distribute public goods is only somewhat broader. In his 
view, while a state may freely "appropriate funds to compensate victims 
of past governmental misconduct for which there is no judicial remedy 
... [, s]uch a voluntary decision by a public body is ... quite different 
from a decision to require one private party to compensate another for 
an unproven injury. " 112 Thus, the state may tax individuals "to pro-
vide direct monetary compensation to any minority-business enterprise 
that the city might have injured in the past,"113 even when there is not 
sufficient proof of injury from past racial discrimination to support a 
judicial remedy. The state may not, however, award a job to which an-
other is "entitled" under traditional selection criteria, unless there is 
sufficient proof of iajury from past racial discrimination to support a 
judicial remedy.114 
Justice Stevens apparently believes that losing money from taxa-
tion is less harmful than losing the benefits of traditional criteria for 
distributing public goods such as jobs or public contracts, and that the 
Court should evaluate whether the state's permissible objectives in re-
dressing the effects of past racial discrimination are sufficiently impor-
tant to justify whatever burdens it imposes. Thus, Stevens would have 
the Court do precisely what it refused to do in Davis: measure the sig-
nificance of harm to individuals caused by otherwise permissible objec-
tives. By concluding that states have more discretion to redefine the 
criteria for entitleIIlent to tax money than to redefine the criteria for 
111. See infra notes 129-130 and accompanying text. 
112. City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 731 n.3 (1989) (Stevens, 
J., concurring). This is a marked change from his position in Wygant: 
The fact that the issue arises in a layoff context, rather than a hiring context, 
has no bearing on the equal protection question. . . . [It is] wholly unpersuasive 
... that a teacher who has been working for a few years suffers greater harm 
when he is laid off than the harm suffered by an unemployed teacher who is 
refused a job for which he is qualified. 
Wygant v.Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267, 319 n.14 (1986) (Stevens,J., dissenting). 
113. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 731 n.3 (Stevens,J., concurring). 
114. ld. 
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entitlement to other public goods, justice Stevens becomes a conserva-
tive judicial activist, according special constitutional protection to tradi-
tional notions of equity and "merit."115 
2. justice O'Connor: While States Are Not Restricted to Redressing judi-
cially Provable Illegal Incidents, They May Seek to Redress Only the Proven Ef-
fects of Identified Discrimination Within Their Own jurisdictions. - Unlike 
justices Scalia and Kennedy, justice O'Connor believes that a state may 
seek to redress the effects of public and private discrimination. Never-
theless, she erects two particularly significant restrictions: a govern-
mental body may seek to redress the effects of past racial 
discrimination, first, only if the discrimination occurred "within its own 
legislative jurisdiction";116 and, second, only if it "identifies" both the 
past "discrimination with the particularity required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment,"117 and the continuing effects of that discrimination.11s 
Reliance on statistical disparities between the proportion of blacks in 
the jurisdiction's general population and the proportion of blacks in a 
given industry in that jurisdiction does not satisfy these requirements of 
particularity.119 
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 120 the Court upheld a congressional statute 
almost identical to that struck down in Croson without reference to any 
such restrictions on Congress's discretion. Based on Fullilove, Rich-
mond argued in Croson that "[i]t would be a perversion of federalism to 
hold that the federal government has a compelling interest in remedy-
115. In Wygant, Justice Stevens also explicitly formulated an inquiry requiring Jus-
tices to make precisely the policy judgments that Davis held should not be made by 
courts: "[W]e should first ask whether the Board's action advances the public inter-
est .... If so, I believe we should consider whether that public interest, and the manner 
in which it is pursued, justifies any adverse effects on the disadvantaged group." 476 
U.S. at 313 (Stevens,J., concurring). 
116. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 720. For another arbitrary restriction, see 'id. at 722-23 
(states may redress only effects of past discrimination within the specific business con-
te>:t addressed by the program); see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 ("governmental 
agency's interest in remedying 'societal' discrimination ... not traceable to its own ac-
tions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster under 
strict scrutiny"). It is not unreasonable, however, to suppose that past racial discrimina-
tion in, for example, public education has continuing effects in many specific employ-
ment contexts. Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that blacks disproportionately failed 
"Test 21" in Washington, D.C. because they had been educated in segregated schools 
declared unconstitutional just twenty-two years before Davis was decided. See Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954). Because the District of Columbia police department 
did not run the city's public schools, however, Justice O'Connor would prohibit any 
consideration of educational discrimination and its effects in determining the permissi-
bility of affirmative action in police hiring. 
117. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 720. 
118. Id. at 724 (suggesting that speculation about effects of even identified past 
racial discrimination is inadequate to support a racial classification adopted to redress 
effects of past racial discrimination). 
119. Id. 
120. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
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ing the effects of racial discrimination in its own public works program, 
but a city government does not." 121 Justice O'Connor responded that 
under section five of the fourteenth amendment, "Congress, unlike any 
State or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to 
enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment."122 Furthermore, 
"[s]ection 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is an explicit constraint on 
state power."123 
But no Supreme Courtjustice has argued that Congress has more 
discretion to violate section one prohibitions than do the states. 124 In-
deed, the Court long has held that section one limitations on state dis-
cretion are applicable to the federal government through the fifth 
amendment's due process clause. 125 Furthermore, it would be difficult 
to argue that section five of the fourteenth amendment was intended to 
give Congress broader discretion than the states have to act consist-
ently with section one. 126 Section five originally was adopted because 
of doubts rooted in principles of federalism about whether Congress 
121. Brief of Appellant City of Richmond at 32, City of Richmond v. j .A. Croson 
Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (No. 87-998) (footnote omitted) (quoted in Croson, 109 S. Ct. 
at 719). 
122. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719. 
123. Id. justice Scalia made a similar point in his concurring opinion: "[l]t is one 
thing to permit racially based conduct by the Federal Government-whose legislative 
powers concerning matters of race were explicitly enhanced by [section five of the Four· 
teenth Amendment]-and quite another to permit it by the precise entities against 
whose conduct in matters of race that Amendment was specifically directed." Id. at 736 
(Scalia,j., concurring). Although one could devote an entire article to the implications 
of § 1 for federal power or the implications of § 5 for state power, a brief discussion 
should be sufficient to suggest that justice O'Connor's view of the matter is actually 
based on disagreement with the policy of affirmative action rather than on interpretive 
premises consistent with judicial conservatism. 
124. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). There justice Brennan, for 
the Court, insisted that"§ 5 does not grant Congress ... discretion' ... to dilute equal 
protection and due process decisions of this Court.' We emphasize that Congress' 
power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the 
Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guaran-
tees." Id. at 651 n.10. Indeed, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 
(1990), justice O'Connor herself asserted in dissent that the "Constitution's guarantee 
of equal protection binds the Federal Government as it does the States, and no lower 
level of scrutiny applies to the Federal Government's use of race classifications." Id. at 
3030 (O'Connor,j., dissenting). Her aim in Metro Broadcasting, however, was to narrow 
Congress's § 5 discretion to coincide with the states' discretion found by the Court in 
Wygant and Croson. See infra notes 139-143 and accompanying text. 
125. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954). 
126. justice Marshall insisted in Croson that § 5 of the fourteenth amendment has 
never been interpreted "to pre-empt or limit state police power to undertake race-con-
scious remedial measures." Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 755 (Marshall, j., dissenting). justice 
Brennan made a similar point in Bakke: "[There is] no reason to conclude that the 
States cannot voluntarily accomplish under § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment what 
Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment validly may authorize or compel 
either the States or private persons to do." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 368 (1978) (Brennan,j., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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had authority to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1866, a statute designed 
to protect blacks from racist discrimination. 121 No one suggested that 
state provisions similar to the Civil Rights Act would violate section 
one. Thus, if neither Congress nor any state can violate section one 
prohibitions, and if section five was adopted to ease doubts about Con-
gress's authority to address civil rights issues consistently with section 
one--when states always possessed such discretion under their general 
police powers-why should Congress be free to redress the effects of 
racial discrimination whether caused in Virginia, Alabama, or Arkansas, 
while Virginia is not free to redress such effects,felt in Virginia, unless 
they were (provably) caused in Virginia?12s 
The answer cannot be that if Virginia seeks to redress effects of 
past racial discrimination felt in Virginia, but caused, in part, by Ala-
bama and Arkansas, Virginia necessarily must be acting because of im-
permissible racial prejudice. One locality might feel the effects of 
another's wrongdoing-for example, pollution-determine that it can-
not live with those effects, and choose in good faith to deal with them. 
While a federal court may order Virginia to redress only those effects of 
its own past wrongdoing, this limit on federal judicial authority rests on 
concerns for federalism and legislative discretion. 129 The idea that one 
state has no legitimate concern about the effects of racial discrimination 
within its borders if caused by other states-that a federal court, in the 
name of the Constitution, may order a state not to redress a condition 
felt within that state, but caused in part by other states-stands these 
premises of federalism and legislative discretion on their heads.130 
In her second significant restriction on state discretion, Justice 
127. See R. Berger, supra note 6, at 113-14; Bickel, The Original Understanding 
and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 18-30 (1955). 
128. One might justifiably impose a different burden of proof on localities, states, 
or Congress, if one believes that there are differing degrees oflikelihood that each acted 
because of impermissible racial animus, favoritism, or stereotype. Justice O'Connor 
touched upon this approach in Croson. Noting that Richmond was governed by a black 
majority, she suggested that "[t]he concern that a political majority will more easily act 
to the disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts 
would seem to militate for, not against, the application ofheightenedjudicial scrutiny in 
this case." Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 722; accord supra note 48. 
129. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743-44 (1974). In Milliken, the 
Court reversed a district court's injunctions ordering the desegregation of public 
schools located in Detroit, as well as in adjacent districts not found to have committed 
constitutional violations. Based on the "controlling principle" that "the scope of the 
remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation," Chief 
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, held that "without an interdistrict violation and 
interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy." 
Id. at 744-45; accord Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 
(1971). Burger was concerned that an injunction not designed to cure a constitutional 
violation "would deprive the people of control of their schools through their elected 
representatives." Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744. 
130. The convergence-more precisely, confusion--of principles appropriate for 
circumscribing federal judicial discretion in erroneously limiting local legislative discre-
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O'Connor prohibits states and localities from relying on a statistical 
disparity between the proportion of blacks in a given profession and 
the proportion of blacks in the general population as a basis for infer-
ring the effects of identified past racial discrimination. She character-
izes reliance on such statistical disparity to prove the effects of 
identified past racial discrimination as "sheer speculation"1S1 that does 
not sufficiently mitigate the chance that "a racial classification is merely 
the product of unthinking stereotypes or a form of racial politics."182 
Yet given real limits on information available to prove a causal con-
nection between past discrimination-even identified past discrimina-
tion iss_and present effects, one inevitably must speculate. Even if one 
identifies long standing public and private policies of racial discrimina-
tion against blacks, and traces the socio-economic condition of blacks 
tion began with justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. In considering whether a state agency 
could act to redress the effects of past racial discrimination, Powell noted that 
[i]n the school cases, the States were required by court order to redress the 
wrongs worked by specific instances of racial discrimination. That goal was far 
more focused than the remedying of effects of "societal discrimination," an 
amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past. 
438 U.S. at 307. He then asserted that "(w]ithout such fiudings of constitutional or 
statutory violations, it cannot be said that the government has any greater interest in 
helping one individual than in refraining from harming another." Id. at 308--09. 
This latter claim is wrong. The government constantly makes judgments about who 
deserves benefits and burdens without findings of, or even concern for, past illegality. A 
legislature's notions of justice are sufficient constitutional basis for most programs redis-
tributing resources-for taking public issue with aspects of individual lives and trans-
forming one "private" interest into another. Considerations underlying this legislative 
discretion are not affected if the government seeks to achieve permissible ends by means 
of a racial classification. See supra text at notes 42-59 (judicially examining equities of 
competing permissible ends not justified by notion that racial classifications compromise 
individual dignity or promote racial prejudice). Of course, if the purpose for redistribu-
tion is itself unconstitutional, the redistribution is invalid-but not because the redistri-
bution is predicated on something other than past illegality. Thus, while there is a 
sound constitutional basis for prohibiting courts from ordering states to change their 
preferred policies absent findings of federal constitutional or statutory violations, the 
notion that states are prohibited from defining their own notions of equitable distribu-
tion, and transferring benefits from one person to another, unless based on findings of 
past illegality, is perverse. 
This distinction was well understood in Swann. Chief justice Burger there said: 
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and 
implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in 
order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have 
a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the 
district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary 
powers of school authorities •.• however, that would not be within the authority of a federal 
court. As with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope 
of the remedy. 
402 U.S. at I6 (emphasis added). 
131. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 724. 
132. Id. at 730. 
133. See infra text at notes 158-162. 
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through time, one still cannot prove causation. Given a substantial 
predicate of identified past discrimination,134 however, it is not unrea-
sonable to examine the proportion of society-at-large that chooses to 
become builders, teachers, doctors, or lawyers, and to suppose that but 
for past racial discrimination, blacks would choose to enter these fields 
in similar numbers.135 
Furthermore, positing the absence of causation is speculative. Jus-
tice O'Connor herself speculates that perhaps blacks simply do not 
want to be doctors, teachers, builders, 136 or broadcasters, and that, 
rather than past racial discrimination, explains their disproportionate 
absence from these fields. This speculation seems far less supportable 
than supposing a causal connection between present disadvantage and 
identified past discrimination.137 Indeed, one might question whether 
Justice O'Connor's speculation that "blacks may be disproportionately 
attracted to industries other than construction"138 (or law, medicine, 
education, or broadcasting) is more likely tainted by constitutionally 
impermissible racism than is a legislature's speculation that blacks 
would choose to become doctors, lawyers, teachers, builders, and 
broadcasters to the same extent that others do, but for identified past 
racial discrimination. 
Thus, in distinguishing Croson from Fullilove,Justice O'Connor ap-
parently believes that reliance on statistical disparities as a basis for 
identifying the effects of past racial discrimination is "sheer specula-
tion" (and unconstitutional) when done by states, but sufficiently in-
formed judgment (and permissible) when done by the federal 
govemment.139 The basis for her restrictive view of state discretion is 
134. See id. 
135. See infra note 137. 
136. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 726 ("Blacks may be disproportionately attracted to 
industries other than construction."). 
137. justice O'Connor suggests that "[b]lacks may be disproportionately attracted 
to industries" other than those in which they are underrepresented, id., as a possible 
explanation that would necessarily supplant a supposed causal connection between pres-
ent underrepresentation and past discrimination. Properly viewed, however, her sug-
gestion merely begs the questions: (i) what does it mean to say that blacks are 
"disproportionately attracted" to other fields, and (ii) if they are, why might blacks be 
"disproportionately attracted" to fields other than those that society most esteems and 
best rewards? The "choice" to enter other fields might be in response to tangible im-
pediments caused by past racial discrimination and, therefore, is not choice--at least not 
meaningful choice--at all. Furthermore, "choice" might be constrained by an individ-
ual's perception of limited personal options-a perception conditioned by the historical 
absence of blacks in a given field. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 
(1954) {"To separate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely 
because of their race generates a feeling ofinferiority as to their status in the community 
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."). Either 
way, the notion that blacks might be "disproportionately attracted to other industries" 
reflects, rather than repudiates, the effects of past racial discrimination. 
138. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 726. 
139. See infra note 162. 
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suggested by the following statement: "Defining these sorts of injuries 
as 'iden~ed discrimination' would give local governments license to 
create a patchwork of racial preferences based on statistical generaliza-
tions about any particular field of endeavor."140 In other words, states 
would be too free to displace traditional (and nonracist) with nontradi-
tional (yet nonracist) criteria for distributing public goods. Perhaps, in 
Justice O'Connor's view, Congress may make such judgments, but to 
allow states to do so as well would be simply too much. 
Indeed, O'Connor has since intimated that allowing Congress to 
make these judgments is also simply too much. In Metro Broadcasting, 
she suggested that Congress's discretion under section five of the four-
teenth amendment might be just as restricted as state discretion has 
been deemed to be under section one. Although justice O'Connor re-
peated the Croson proposition that "Congress has considerable latitude, 
presenting special concerns for judicial review, when it exercises its 
'unique remedial powers . . . under § 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment,' " 141 she also stated that "[t]he Constitution's guarantee of equal 
protection binds the Federal Government as it does the States, and no 
lower level of scrutiny applies to the Federal Government's use of racial 
classifications."142 Thus, her judgment restricting state-and now, per-
haps, federal--discretion seems to be informed by the same preference 
for traditional distributional criteria underlying the inconsistent treat-
ment of harmful impact in Davis and Wygant .143 
140. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 724 (emphasis added). In Metro Broadcasting, however, 
justice O'Connor acknowledged that the "shortfall" between the "demographic repre-
sentation" of blacks and their control of broadcast concerns "may be traced in part to 
the discrimination and the patterns of exclusion that have widely affected our society." 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3033 (1990) (O'Connor,j., dissent-
ing). Because the program challenged there was justified not as a remedial measure, but 
as a device to promote broadcast "diversity," she did not need to indicate whether reli-
ance on such general disparity would have constituted "identified" discrimination and, 
therefore, a permissible subject of congressional concern. 
141. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3030 (O'Connor,j., dissenting). 
142. Id. 
143. At the core of justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Croson was the following 
statement: 
[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by 
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to war-
rant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen 
"fit" this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the 
motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype. 
Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721. This statement contains two distinct ideas: First, disfavored, 
but permissible, evils inherent in racial classifications may be outweighed by sufficiently 
important state interests. To the extent that part of what makes a racial classification 
"suspect" is its impact on "innocent white victims," as she indicates in Metro 
Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3043 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), justice O'Connor has em-
braced an approach to racial classifications inconsistent with Washington v. Davis. The 
true judicial conservative would reject this balancing inquiry. Second, since the state 
may not act because of racial prejudice, the Court's task is to determine whether the 
government has, in fact, acted because of racial prejudice. This is entirely consistent 
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* * * 
Concern for the "innocent white victims" of affirmative action ad-
dressed explicitly in Wygant as a basis for invalidating an affirmative ac-
tion program is implicitly reflected in the conditions that Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Stevens, and O'Connor develop in Croson for restrictively de-
fining when the purpose of redressing the effects of past racial discrimi-
nation is permissible. These conditions have nothing to do with 
determining whether the government acted because of impermissible 
racial animus, favoritism, or stereotype. They have everything to do 
with whether individual Justices view the state's redefinition of policies 
allocating public goods as wise or "fair." Political conservatism, rather 
thanjudicial conservatism, pervades the Court's restrictions on legisla-
tive discretion to redress the effects of past racial discrimination. 
B. Focusing on a Search for Racial Animus, Favoritism, and Stereotype 
I do not suggest that states and localities should be free to use 
racial classifications that benefit traditional victims of racial prejudice 
however, and to whatever extent, they wish. Thus, I suggest neither 
that each program the Court has invalidated should have been upheld, 
nor, indeed, that each program the Court has upheld should have been 
upheld.144 I do suggest, however, that localities, states, and the federal 
government should be free to enact affirmative action programs only 
if-and whenever-their policies were not adopted because of racial ani-
mus, favoritism, or stereotype.145 
with Davis-impermissible purpose, rather than "unfair" impact, is the essence of an 
equal protection violation-and should be the Court's focus in reviewing the constitu-
tionality of affirmative action programs. 
144. See infra notes 158-165 and accompanying text. 
145. Given this substantive constitutional principle, strict scrutiny, middle tier scru-
tiny, rationality review, or any other judicial "test" would involve a search for impermis-
sible racial prejudice. Justice O'Connor was surely right when she said: "The history of 
racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or 
executive pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection analysis." 
Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 725. This is not to say, however, that a court should mechanically 
examine all racial classifications as if they were indistinguishable. Classifications that 
disadvantage traditional victims of prejudice, see, e.g., KorematSu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (Murphy,J., dissenting), are more likely to have been motivated by 
racial animus than are classifications that benefit these traditional victims-which are 
more likely to have been motivated by impermissible racial favoritism, or stereotype. 
See also Ely, supra note 41, at 73~36 (discussing the situation in which a majority takes 
steps to benefit the minority). Whatever label the Court gives to its "test,'' its analysis 
should focus on the search for impermissible prejudice, and be sensitive to the implica-
tions of context. 
Employing different standards of review-or burdens of proof-depending on con-
text (e.g., whether whites or blacks are disadvantaged by a racial classification) does not 
violate justice Stevens's notion that "[t]here is only one equal protection clause." Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens,J., concurring). Different standards ofre-
view do not necessarily provide one person or group with more protection than others. 
Rather, if there is a different likelihood in different contexts that the government has 
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This principle is entirely consistent with a true judicial conserva-
tive' s respect for legislative discretion and requirement of a firm basis 
for finding constitutionally mandated values. A constitutional prohibi-
tion of any governmental policy motivated by racial animus or favorit-
ism-value judgments about race per se-not only is rooted in the 
original understanding of the equal protection clause, 146 but reflects a 
present consensus in national public discourse, 147 between Congress 
acted because of impermissible racial prejudice, a different burden of proof might well 
be warranted in those contexts. Indeed, justice Stevens would not suggest that facially 
neutral actions, see, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976), should be 
subject to the same presumption of impermissible prejudice as a racial classification, see, 
e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216; see infra note 153. Despite different burdens of proving 
unconstitutionality in these two contexts, the same constitutional value is at issue: the 
government may not pursue impermissible purposes reflecting racism. 
146. Cf. Bickel, supra note 127, at 56-65 (fourteenth amendment originally was 
intended to proscribe state mandated racial discrimination only in certain contexts, and 
left states free to use racial classifications for certain racist purposes). A principle that 
the equal protection clause prohibits all governmental action motivated by racial preju-
dice, rather thanjust those actions envisioned by the original understanding of the equal 
protection clause, far better reflects political morality today. See Chang, supra note 37, 
at 841- 55. Thus, ouly the most committed originalist would insist on interpreting the 
fourteenth amendment today as permitting, for example, racial segregation mandated 
by states and localities. See, e.g., R. Berger, supra note 6, at 166-92. 
But one need not be a rigid originalist to be a judicial conservative. The essence of 
judicial conservatism-as indicated in President Bush's assertion that judges must not 
"legislate," but "interpret"-isjudicial refusal to intrude on legislative choices except to 
enforce public values established to a point approaching national consensus. Judicial 
conservatives might choose to find this consensus by referring to original intent, or 
other evidence of prevailing public values. See supra note 6. Depending on just how 
willing they are to risk intruding erroneously on legislative discretion, see infra text at 
notes 176-180,judicial conservatives who go beyond originalism might view public val-
ues established to a point approaching national consensus-or "conventional morality," 
see supra note 71-as a necessary, but not sufficient, basis for judicial action. Thus, one 
might require particularly strong evidence of consensus, and one might also view even a 
proven consensus as judicially irrelevant unless related to values underlying specific 
constitutional provisions. See supra note 69. For further analysis of this version of con-
stitutional law, see Chang, supra note 37, at 799-805, 819-23. 
There is surely consensus today that at least the original understanding of the equal 
protection clause should be enforced. Beyond this, there is today a national consensus, 
indicated by congressional and state legislation prohibiting racial discrimination, see in-
fra notes 155-156 and accompanying text, that much more than this original under-
standing should be enforced in prohibiting policies motivated by racism. Thus, judicial 
conservatives today can be comfortable with a doctrine that the equal protection clause 
prohibits all state action undertaken because of racial prejudice. Only judicial conserva-
tives who believe that there is a similar national consensus against affirmative action-as 
well as an antifederalism consensus that dissenting localities should be prohibited from 
pursuing their own preferences for affirmative action-can hope to justify restricting 
legislative discretion to determine whether and how to redress effects of past racial dis-
crimination. See supra note 71. The prevalence of affirmative action programs adopted 
by states and localities throughout the nation, however, belies this proposition. For dis-
cussion of the relationship between originalism and "color-blindness," see supra note 
37. 
147. The Republican National Committee's repudiation of former Klansman David 
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and the Executive, 148 and within the Supreme Court itself. 149 The nor-
mative proposition is clear and persuasive: no person should be viewed 
as better or worse than another, no person should be viewed as unfit 
for one life plan or another, simply because of her race. 
A constitutional prohibition of governmental policy devised be-
cause of racial stereotype also should not be problematic for the judi-
cial conservative. This constitutional principle merely would prohibit a 
legislature from acting based on unexamined factual premises that race 
correlates with certain characteristics relevant to achieving its permissi-
ble objectives-that is, objectives that do not reflect racial animus or 
favoritism. Thus, a proscription against racial stereotype can be viewed 
as promajoritarian. By requiring legislatures to examine their factual 
premises more carefully than they otherwise might, this proscription 
can help legislatures pursue their own permissible objectives more ef-
fectively than they otherwise might.150 
Duke is but one example. Indeed, even "hardliner" conservative Republicans reject 
Duke. "[Ilhey fear that if one of their own does not challenge Bush [in 1992), former 
Klansman David Duke will try to become the right-wing standard-bearer." Ellis, Watch 
Your Back, George, Time, Dec. IO, 1990, at 23. 
148. Congress and the executive branch have joined to create numerous civil rights 
statutes designed to prohibit racist choices by both public decision makers, see, e.g., 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1966) (upholding § 4(e) of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 and its application in preempting state restriction on voting rights 
apparently motivated by racial animus), and private decision makers, see, e.g., Katzen-
bach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) (upholding Title II of Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and its application to prohibit-racist exclusion of patrons from restaurants engaged 
in interstate commerce). 
149. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and 
Kennedy, has suggested that motivation by racial animus or favoritism is unconstitu-
tional. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3032 (1990) (O'Connor, 
J., dissenting) (quoting City ofRichmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 722 (1989)) 
("absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for ... race-based measures, 
there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and 
what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or 
simple racial politics"). Justice Powell has declared that "[p]referring members of any 
one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin" is "invalid." Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (plurality opinion). In Bakke, Justice 
Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, declared that racial classifi-
cations "drawn on the presumption that one race is inferior to another or ... [that] put 
the weight of government behind racial hatred and separatism ... are invalid without 
more." Id. at 357-58 (Brennan,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
·' 150. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197, 222-24 (1976) 
(advocating ·reconception of "rationality review" as judicial scrutiny of lawmaking 
processes toward promoting better legislative accountability). This suggests another 
benefit for judicial conservatives from a purpose-oriented definition of unconstitutional-
ity: Ajudicial finding that a given program was adopted because of impermissible preju-
dice allows a legislature to reenact the program if motivated by permissible 
considerations. See J. Ely, supra note 9, at 138-39 ("sometimes an action invalidated 
because it was taken for unconstitutional reasons will be able to be retaken, this time 
putatively on legitimate grounds the courts will have to credit"-but "only where there 
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Assuming that a proscription of governmental policies motivated 
by racial animus, favoritism, or stereotype properly describes the sub-
stantive essence of unconstitutional racial discrimination for a judicial 
conservative, the task remains to define methods of judicial inquiry-
essentially, proof rules-by which a court should determine whether a 
challenged policy was so motivated. In the following sections, I suggest 
five principles for judicial inquiry that not only are tailored to determin-
ing whether a challenged affirmative action program employing racial 
classification was enacted because of impermissible racism, but also are 
consistent with a judicial conservative's healthy respect for legislative 
judgment. 
1. The Government Bears the Burden of Proof. - In applying "strict 
scrutiny" to racial classifications, the Court places the burden of proof 
on the state to rebut a presumption of unconstitutionality.151 What the 
state must prove depends on what constitutional proscription presump-
tively has been violated. 152 When that relevant proscription concerns 
exists a plausible legitimate explanation") (relying upon Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 
217, 224-25 (1971)). Thus, after determining that the affirmative action program in 
Metro Broadcasting was adopted because of impermissible stereotype toward a goal of 
broadcast diversity, Justice O'Connor noted that "[t]he FCC or Congress may yet con-
clude after suitable examination that narrowly tailored race-conscious measures are re-
quired to remedy discrimination that may be identified in the allocation Of broadcasting 
licenses. Such measures are clearly within the Government's power." Metro Broadcasting, 
110 S. Ct. at 3033 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In contrast, an approach that balances 
interests of "innocent white victims" of affirmative action against the interests of "inno-
cent black victims" of the effects of past racial discrimination as a judicial question leaves 
legislatures precluded from making certain value judgments in accommodating permis-
sible competing considerations. 
151. Members of the Court have argued at length about whether affirmative action 
programs should be subjected to "strict scrutiny" or "middle tier scrutiny." See, e.g., 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287-305 (urging "strict scrutiny"); id. at 356-62 (Brennan,J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (urging "middle-tier scrutiny"). But 
these labels are meaningless if one does not clearly identify, and focus on, relevant sub-
stantive constitutional values-the norms at issue that warrant protection. "Strict scru-
tiny" that searches for impermissible prejudice requires quite a different analysis from 
"strict scrutiny" that seeks to protect the interests of "innocent white victims." The 
former seeks interpretive fact, such as legislative intent, while the latter seeks judgments 
of "fairness" through ad hoc balancing. See infra note 152. Indeed, by failing to tailor 
his analysis precisely even to the values he deemed constitutionally relevant, Justice 
Powell seemed to apply different standards in his scrutiny of the challenged program in 
Bakke when examining different asserted state interests. See infra note 163. Justice 
Powell also claimed to apply "strict scrutiny" in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 498 
(1980) (Powell, J., concurring), but was far more deferential to the legislature in that 
case than he was in Bakke. See infra note 162. 
152. When the Court's conservative Justices have expressed concern about "fair-
ness" to "innocent white victims," they have placed the burden on the states to rebut a 
presumption of"unfairness." Thus, true judicial conservatism is twice offended because 
the problems of 'judicial legislation" inherent in a Justice's balancing of competing per-
missible equities, see supra text accompanying notes 74-76, 109-110, are compounded 
by a doctrine that gives presumptively greater credence to that Justice's personal 
balance. 
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public policy motivated by racial animus, favoritism, or stereotype, 
strict scrutiny should mean that the government must rebut a presump-
tion that it acted because of racial animus, favoritism, or stereotype.153 
2. The State Must Assert a Purpose that Does Not Reflect Racial Animus, 
Favoritism, or Stereotype. - In order to rebut a presumption that it has 
employed a racial classification because of racial animus, favoritism, or 
stereotype, the state must, at a minimum, assen purposes that do not 
themselves reflect racist values.154 In Bakke, for example, the California 
Board of Regents assened that one of its purposes was to ensure a cer-
tain proportion of racial and ethnic groups in the medical school. Jus-
tice Powell rejected this purpose as itself reflecting impermissible 
valuations of race per se: 
If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body 
some specified percentage of a particular group merely because 
of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be 
rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid. Preferring 
members of any one group for no reason other than race or 
ethnic origin is discrimination for i~s own sake. This the Con-
stitution forbids.155 
153. Justices Stevens and O'Connor have expressed this rationale for viewing racial 
classifications as presumptively unconstitutional: "Because racial characteristics so sel-
dom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment, ... it is especially important that 
the reasons for any such classifications be clearly identified and unquestionably legiti-
mate." Metro Broadcasting, llO S. Ct. at 3029-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 533-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
It makes sense to view racial classifications as presumptively unconstitutional for 
several reasons. First, as a matter of history, at least before affirmative action became 
politically viable, racial classifications have been instruments of racial animus. See, e.g., 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543-45 (1896); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483, 493-94 (1954). Second, as a matter oflogic, there are few purposes to which race 
bears a reasonable relationship that do not reflect racial animus or favoritism. See 
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 533-35 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Third, when thinking in explicitly 
racial terms, people tend to make sloppy generalizations-in other words, they stereo-
type. See G. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 187-99 (1958); Ely, supra note 41, at 
732-33. Thus, assuming that it is equally problematic to intrude erroneously on valid 
legislative discretion as it is to uphold erroneously an impermissible policy motivated by 
racial prejudice, see infra text at notes 176-178, the burden of proof for this question of 
fact (legislative motivation) should rest on a judgment about probability-that is, the 
question should be whether, when using a racial classification, a government more likely 
than not has acted because of racial prejudice. 
154. Justice O'Connor has made a similar point with respect to gender discrimina-
tion. "Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects 
archaic and stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' 
members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap 
or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate." Mississippi Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982). 
155. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (emphasis added). Similarly, in a challenge to its an-
timiscegenation law, Virginia asserted a goal of"preserv[ing] 'racial integrity.'" Loving 
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, ll n.ll (1967) (Stewart,J., concurring). Justice Stewart, concur-
ring, noted that this goal reflected a purpose "to maintain White Supremacy" that was 
not permissible, but "invidious.'' Id. at 11. 
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Governments frequently assert two other purposes served by their 
affirmative action programs: to redress the effects of past racial dis-
crimination and to promote diversity.156 Asserting a desire to redress 
the effects of past racial discrimination does not on its face reflect a 
view that one race is better or worse than another; rather, it suggests a 
judgment that past social practices were wrong, and that the effects of 
past wrongs should not be allowed to persist. Similarly, asserting a de-
sire to ensure a diversity of viewpoints in an educational or political 
setting does not on its face suggest impermissible racial animus or fa-
voritism. Thus, as asserted, these are permissible purposes.157 Given a 
presumption of unconstitutionality, however, mere assertion should 
not be enough. A court should go further to determine that the as-
serted permissible purpose truly underlies the challenged racial classifi-
cation, and that the legislature did not choose racial means to achieve 
its permissible ends because of racial stereotype. 
3. Before Having Enacted Its ChaUenged Program, the Federal or State 
Policymaker Must Have Examined and Articulated the Relationship Between its 
Non-Racist Purpose and its Racially Specific Selection Criteria. - Requiring 
the state to identify the past discrimination whose effects it seeks to 
redress is a sensible way of mitigating the possibility that impermissible 
racial stereotype tainted a racial classification that was intended to serve 
permissible purposes. Indeed, Justice Stevens has suggested thatjudi-
cial review of racial classifications "should include a consideration of 
the procedural character of the [legislature's] decisionmaking pro-
cess."158 Specifically, "[w]hen Congress creates a special preference, 
or a special disability, for a class of persons, it should identify the char-
acteristic that justifies the special treatment. When the classification is 
defined in racial terms, I believe that such particular identification is 
imperative."159 Underlying his desire for legislative findings is concern 
about stereotype. He elaborated: 
The risk that habitual attitudes toward classes of persons, 
rather than analysis of the relevant characteristics of the class, 
will serve as a basis for a legislative classification is present 
when benefits are distributed as well as when burdens are im-
posed. In the past, traditional attitudes too often provided the 
156. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3004; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306. 
157. In Metro Broadcasting,]ustice O'Connor again displays a balancing mentality by 
arguing that the goal of redressing past racial discrimination is the only "compelling" 
interest that canjustify the use of racial classifications. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 
3034 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). While promoting broadcast diversity is permissible, 
and perhaps even "important," it is "insufficiently weighty" and, therefore, not "com-
pelling." Id.; see also id. at 3036 ("Even if an interest is determined to be legitimate in 
one context, it does not suddenly become important enough to justify distinctions based 
on race."). This is yet another example ofa conservative judicial activism that is willing 
to strike arbitrary balances among competing permissible considerations different from 
those struck by legislatures. See supra text at notes 89-90. 
158. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 551 (1980) (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
159. Id. at 553. 
1991] JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM'! 
only explanation for discrimination against women, aliens, il-
legitimates, and black citizens. Today there is a danger that 
awareness of past injustice will lead to automatic acceptance of 
new classifications that are not in fact justified by attributes 
characteristic of the class as a whole.160 
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Indeed, if legislative decision makers were required to make formal 
findings of fact about past racial discrimination-e.g., which groups 
have suffered, the generations during which each group has suffered, 
the contexts and manner in which each group has suffered-they would 
generate a relatively firm foundation for drawing reasonable conclu-
sions about the continuing consequences of that past racial discrimina-
tion. Thus, in Bakke, for example, if California had made findings of 
fact about past racial discrimination, it might have decided not to prefer 
"Blacks," "Chicanos," "Asians," and "American Indians" as it did, 161 
but perhaps, to exclude some, to include others, to refine the criteria 
for inclusion, or to identify priorities for categories of inclusion. Simi-
larly, in Fullilove, had Congress made meaningful findings of fact rele-
vant to its asserted permissible remedial purposes, it might have 
decided to define criteria of inclusion other than "Negroes, Spanish-
speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts."162 
160. Id. at 552-53. 
Although he has not suggested that governments make findings of fact before adopt-
ing an affirmative action program, Justice Marshall would require that the "government 
adduce evidence that, taken as a whole, is sufficient to support its claimed interest and to 
dispel the natural concern that it acted out of mere 'paternalistic stereotyping, not on a 
careful consideration of modern social conditions.' " City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 745 (1989) (Marshall,J., dissenting). Yet justice Marshall was satis-
fied with Richmond's fact finding method- even though it amounted to little more than 
reliance on the congressional "fact finding" that had preceded passage of the affirmative 
action program challenged in Fullilove. See infra note 163. 
161. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 274 (1978) (plurality 
opinion). 
162. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 454. The factual "findings" implicitly held adequate in 
Fullilove were little more than conclusory assertions that, properly viewed, could not 
help to rebut a presumption that Congress acted because of unexamined racial stereo-
type. A House Committee reported in 1975 that "[t]he effects of past inequities stem-
ming from racial prejudice have not remained in the past." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 465 
(emphasis omitted). The Report then noted statistical disparities in the representation 
of different racial groups in business and professional contexts, and concluded that 
"[t]hese statistics are not the result of random chance. The presumption must be made 
that past discriminatory systems have resulted in present economic inequities." Id.; ac-
cord Minority Enterprise and Allied Problems of Small Business: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise of the House Comm. on Small 
Business, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1975). These "findings" reveal no effort to identify 
the sources of discrimination, the different contexts of discrimination, or the duration of 
discrimination, with respect to any of the specific groups covered in the challenged con-
gressional plan. Much more relevant information was readily available than was em-
ployed. On this basis, even if Congress had formally adopted the 1975 House 
Committee Report, a judicial conservative would have been justified in determining that 
the government had not met its burden to rebut the presumption that it has employed a 
racial classification because of impermissible animus, favoritism, or stereotype. Thus, 
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This point has similar force when a racial classification is employed 
as a means for effectuating the permissible purpose of fostering diver-
sity. lfbeing "Black" or "Chicano" corresponds to some characteristic 
that will contribute to educational diversity, for example, what charac-
teristic is it? In Bakke, had the university made findings of fact about 
the relationship between race and educational diversity, it might have 
constructed its programs differently by concluding, perhaps, that race 
is a necessary, but not sufficient, proxy for the sort of diversity it 
sought. 163 In Metro Broadcasting, had the FCC made findings of fact 
about the relationship between race and viewpoint toward achieving 
broadcast diversity, it might have made similar adjustments.164 
Under the approach that I suggest here, formal findings of relevant 
fact would be part of the government's burden in rebutting the pre-
sumption that it employed a racial classification because of impermissi-
ble racial animus, favoritism, or stereotype. Without formal findings of 
relevant fact preceding the enactment of an affirmative action program, 
the program would be struck down. Thus, under this approach, the 
programs challenged in Bakke, Fullilove, Croson, and Metro Broadcasting 
all would have been invalidated. 
Despite this apparent judicial intrusiveness, the premises of judi-
while justice O'Connor in Croson suggested that Congress "need not make specific find-
ings of discrimination to engage in race-conscious relief," 109 S. Ct. at 719, I would 
impose no less a requirement on Congress than on the states to rebut a presumption of 
unexamined stereotype. See supra text at notes 151-157. 
163. Ironically, although Justice Powell was so insistent on findings of fact when 
race serves as a proxy for those who suffer the effects of past racial discrimination, he 
easily and quickly accepted the unexamined notion that race can serve as a proxy for 
"educational diversity" when he spoke favorably of a Harvard admissions program in 
which "race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's 
file." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-17. "This kind of program treats each applicant as an 
individual in the admissions process." Id. at 318. Yet the basis for Harvard's decision to 
give a "plus" based on race is a premise that, for example, " 'a black student can usually 
bring something that a white person cannot offer.'" Id. at 316 (quoting Harvard's de-
scription of its admissions program). Thus stated, the linkage of race to diversity is no 
less conclusory-no less an unexamined stereotype-than the linkage of race to the ef-
fects of past racial discrimination or the linkage of race to the likelihood that doctors 
would choose to practice medicine in traditionally underserved communities. As justice 
Powell noted: 
"An applicant of whatever race who has demonstrated his concern for disad-
vantaged minorities in the past and who declares that practice in such a com-
munity is his primary professional goal would be more likely to contribute to 
alleviation of the medical shortage than one who is chosen entirely on the basis 
of race and disadvantage. In short, there is no empirical data to demonstrate 
that any one race is more selflessly socially oriented or by contrast that another 
is more selfishly acquisitive." 
Id. at 311 (quoting lower court opinion). If justice Powell had been consistent in his 
insistence that racial classifications must be supported by relevant findings of fact, he 
would not have accepted the Harvard program as a model for higher education in public 
institutions. 
164. See infra text at notes 165, 172-173. 
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cial conservatism would be served in several ways. First, judges would 
not decide questions of constitutionality based on personal value judg-
ments; the basis for invalidation would be a legislative's failure to com-
ply with a clear procedural requirement. Second, the procedural 
requirement is tailored to the relatively uncontroversial notion that the 
government should not act because of racial stereotype. Third, if the 
Court ever did impose this procedural requirement, it would be rela-
tively easy for legislatures to comply. Indeed, if Bakke, for example, 
had been decided under this approach, the programs challenged in Ful-
lilove, Croson, and Metro Broadcasting all might well have been supported 
by formal findings of relevant fact made before their enactment. Fi-
nally, and perhaps most significantly, the programs might have looked 
quite different-better tailored to their stated permissible objectives-
if based on findings of fact. 165 Thus, this procedural requirement 
could make legislatures themselves better able to avoid violating the 
proscription against racial animus, favoritism, and stereotype in public 
policy, and thereby could reduce the need for otherwise intrusive judi-
cial review. 
4. The State Should Not Be Precluded From Making judgments About the 
Effects of Past Racial Discrimination Infonned by Imperfect Findings of Fact if the 
Findings Are Based on the Best Infonnation Reasonably Available. - Even if a 
legislature makes findings of historical fact about, for example, which 
groups have suffered past racial discrimination, the generations during 
which each group has suffered, and the contexts and manner in which 
each group has suffered, it cannot have identified the effects of that 
history with either particularity or certainty. Thus, statistical disparities 
between the proportion of blacks in a given field and the proportion of 
whites in that same field might reflect the effects of identified past racial 
discrimination. Of course, such disparities might be otherwise explaina-
ble, as Justice O'Connor has suggested.166. 
Yet much significant public policy is based on unproven and un-
provable factual premises. For example, some believe that the death 
165. By identifying the foundation for its policy, the legislature also will have devel-
oped a basis for mitigating resentment against the policy and, thereby, address con-
cerns-politically significant but constitutionally irrelevant-that affirmative action 
might promote racial prejudice. See supra text at notes 52-59. 
166. See supra text at notes 131-135. But even though one cannot do much more 
than speculate about the effects of past racial discrimination, Justice O'Connor has cho-
sen to resolve the significance of doubt in favor of the status quo, by disabling govern-
ments from acting at all. See supra text at notes 139-143. Without substantial evidence 
of past racial discrimination that could have caused present statistical disparities, there is 
little basis for finding that present disparities represent the effects of past racial discrimi-
nation. Thus, it might be more difficult to make the case that present statistical dispari-
ties between whites and groups other than blacks and Native Americans reflect the 
results of past racial discrimination than it would be to make the case with respect to 
blacks and Native Americans, who have been the victims of racial discrimination longer 
and more pervasively than has any other group in America. 
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penalty deters crime; 167 others believe that it does not. 168 Some be-
lieve that lowering tax rates can increase tax revenues; others disa-
gree.169 What legislatures choose to do with these unprovable factual 
premises depends upon how they balance relevant public values. If 
people view the goal of deterring crime to be relatively important, they 
are willing to accept more uncertainty in the factual premise that the 
death penalty deters crime. Similarly, the more that people value re-
dressing the effects of past racial discrimination, the more uncertainty 
they are willing to accept about the factual premise that present statisti-
cal disparities reflect the effects of past racial discrimination.170 
It would be contrary to a judicial conservative's respect for political 
discretion to hold, as does justice O'Connor in Croson, that unless pres-
ent disparities are provably related to identified past racial discrimina-
tion, legislatures are constitutionally prohibited from determining that 
their remedial, goals are sufficiently important to justify affirmative ac-
tion programs that can help attain those goals: More specifically, it 
would be contrary to Davis's proscription only of impermissible racist 
purposes to hold that a legislature may not seek to redress the effects of 
past racial discrimination (that is, a permissible, nonracist goal) when 
the perceived need for legislative action is supported by a study yield-
ing the best available information (that is, a factual premise that does 
not reflect unexamined racial stereotype).171 
167. See, e.g., Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of 
Life and Death, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 397, 401-02 (1975); Van Den Haag, On Deterrence 
and the Death Penalty, 60 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 141, 145-46 (1969). 
168. Cf. C. Black, Capital Punishment: The Inevitability of Caprice and Mistake 
(1974) (arguing that no affirmative case can be made that capital punishment deters). 
169. After Jack Kemp and Art Laffer first suggested to Ronald Reagan that lower-
ing tax rates could increase tax revenues, "[i]t set off a symphony in his ears. He knew 
instantly that it was true and would never doubt it a moment thereafter." D. Stockman, 
The Triumph of Politics 10 (1986). Paul Samuelson relies on empirical results rather 
than faith in rejecting "supply-side" tax policy. "The Laffer-curve prediction that reve-
nues would rise following ... tax cuts has proven false; indeed, federal revenues shrank 
and the federal budget consequently moved from approximate balance in 1979 to a 
gaping $200 billion deficit after 1983." P. Samuelson & W. Nordhaus, Economics 796-
97 (13th ed. 1989). 
170. See supra note 108. 
171. I do not suggest that a vague assertion of past "societal discrimination" 
should be sufficient. Cf. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3035 (1990) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (" 'generalized assertion' " of past " '[s]ocietal discrimina-
tion, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified rem-
edy' "). Governments surely have the resources to employ historians, for example, to 
establish a factual predicate of past racial discrimination. Yet Justice O'Connor still 
might assert that allowing legislatures to engage in reasonable speculation about the 
effects of past identified discrimination would have " 'no logical stopping point' and 
would support unconstrained uses of racial classifications." Id. Not so. The "logical 
stopping point" is that found by the political process; the "constraint" on remedial 
measures is placed by competing social pressures. So long as the competition is among 
competing permissible ends, the judicial conservative should allow the political process 
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5. The Relationships Among the Asserted Permissible Purpose, the Identified 
Factual Predicate, and the Means Selected Must Provide a Plausible Basis for 
Finding that the Government Was Not Impermissibly Motivated by Racial Ani-
mus, Favoritism, or Stereotype. - Even with the best findings of past racial 
discrimination, and the most reasonable speculation about continuing 
effects, a poor fit between the means selected and the asserted permis-
sible, nonracist purpose might preclude a finding that the classification 
was not adopted because of racial animus, favoritism, or stereotype.172 
If, for example, the sta.te asserts the permissible goal of redressing the 
effects of past racial discrimination, makes findings of historical fact 
about past racial discrimination, and makes speculative findings about 
the present effects of that identified discrimination, it might well reveal 
criteria in addition to race that will better identify those who suffer the 
effects of past racial discrimination-for example, poverty, geographi-
cal origin, or educational background. Similarly, a program allegedly 
intended to promote viewpoint diversity might be less effective if race is 
used as the sole proxy for viewpoint, rather than in conjunction with 
other factors relevant to viewpoint. Toward rebutting the presumption 
of unconstitutionality, the government should be required to provide a 
plausible explanation of why it chose not to employ additional factors 
for identifying those who suffer the effects of past racial discrimination, 
or those who would promote diversity.mi 
The program challenged in Croson provides another example of a 
poor fit between an asserted permissible purpose and the chosen 
means that could render the state unable to rebut a presumption that it 
acted because of racial animus, favoritism, or stereotype. Richmond 
claimed that it sought to redress the effects of past racial discrimina-
tion. The past discrimination at issue and its supposed consequences 
were broadly based and widely dispersed. Yet the Richmond program 
required that thirty percent of all subcontracting dollars go to minority 
businesses, while only five percent of subcontractors nationally were 
minority businesses.174 Thus, relatively few minority businesses stood 
to work its will, unconstrained by ad hoc judicial findings of "unfair" racial 
discrimination. 
172. justice O'Connor has made this point with particular clarity: "[S]trict scrutiny 
is designed to 'ensur[e] that the means chosen 'fit' [the] compelling goal so closely that 
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial 
prejudice or stereotype.'" Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3037 (O'Connor,J., dissent-
ing) (quoting City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 721 (1989)); see also 
J. Ely, supra note 9, at 145 ("The goal the classification in issue is likely to fit most 
closely ... is the goal the legislators actually had in mind.''). 
173. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3039 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
("The interest the FCC asserts is in programming diversity, yet in adopting the chal-
lenged policies, the FCC expressly disclaimed having attempted any direct efforts to 
achieve its asserted goal.''). For consideration of my suggested standard of a "plausible 
explanation," see infra note 180. 
174. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 713, 714. The percentage of minority contractors 
based in Richmond was "almost zero.'' Id. at 751 (Marshall,J., dissenting). 
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to benefit-and they would have benefitted greatly. One might ques-
tion the extent to which these pinpointed windfalls help to redress the 
widely dispersed effects of past racial discrimination by society-at-
large.175 Given a presumption that the government has acted with im-
permissible racial animus, favoritism, or stereotype in using a racial 
classification, there is a basis for invalidation in the government's fail-
ure to provide a plausible explanation of why it has apparently pro-
vided such a large benefit to so few who potentially suffer from the 
broadly spread effects of broadly based past racial discrimination. 
* * * 
Judicial conservatives are concerned about both enforcing firmly es-
tablished constitutional values and not erroneously intruding on valid 
democratic discretion. 176 Courts might erroneously refrain from en-
forcing firmly established constitutional values by using proof rules that 
give the government an unwarranted benefit of the doubt. Courts 
might erroneously intrude on the authority of the people's elected rep-
resentatives either by imposing substantive values that are not constitu-
tionally warranted (for example, by invalidating affirmative action 
programs based on personal judgments that "innocent white victims" 
are "unfairly" affected),177 or, in determining whether firmly estab-
lished constitutional norms (for example, the proscription of actions 
motivated by racial animus, favoritism, or sterotype) have been vio-
lated, by applying proof rules that are too easily satisfied.178 
The foregoing five propositions provide meaningful content for 
the state's burden of proof under "strict scrutiny" with, essentially, a 
procedural roadmap that governments must follow if they wish to per-
suade a court that they have employed a racial classification to achieve 
policies untainted by racial animus, favoritism, or stereotype. Their de-
sign is derived exclusively from this firmly established substantive con-
stitutional value. Yet some judicial conservatives, concerned more 
about the erroneous intrusion on valid legislative choices, might argne 
that these five propositions place an excessive burden on the govern-
175. Justice Marshall did not view the 30% requirement as warranting invalidation 
because in Fullilove, where the Court upheld a similar program, "Congress' 10% figure 
fell roughly halfway between the present percentage of minority contractors and the 
percentage of minority group members in the Nation .... The Richmond City Council's 
30% figure falls roughly halfway between the present percentage of Richmond-based 
minority contractors (almost zero) and the percentage of minorities in Richmond 
(50%)." Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 751 (Marshall,]., dissenting) (citation omitted). Splitting 
the difference, however, is not always a rational way to pursue one's goals. 
176. See supra notes 146-150. 
177. See supra note 69 (discussion of judicial conservatives' rejection of constitu-
tional privacy). 
178. In City of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
266-68, 270 (1977), the Court, reflecting judicial conservatives' desire to avoid the sec-
ond error, rejected doctrines facilitating proof that facially neutral policies were adopted 
because of impermissible racism. 
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ment to disprove impermissible motivation.179 Others, concerned 
more about erroneous refusals to enforce the firmly established consti-
tutional proscription against governmental policies adopted because of 
racial animus, favoritism, or stereotype, might argue that the five prin-
ciples give the government an unwarranted benefit of the doubt. 180 
For any true judicial conservative, however, at least one point 
179. It is not likely that former Justice Powell and Chief Justice Rehnquist would 
object to my five propositions on the grounds that they unduly presume impermissible 
motive and thereby facilitate the invalidation of affirmative action programs. Yet in 
Rodgers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), they dissented from the Court's determination 
that a city had maintained an at-large voting system "for invidious purposes," id. at 616, 
and stated: 
The Court's decision today relies heavily ou the capacity of the federal district 
courts-essentially free from any standards propounded by this Court-to de-
termine whether at-large voting systems are "being maintained for the invidi-
ous purpose of diluting the voting strength of the black population." Federal 
courts thus are invited to engage in deeply subjective inquiries into the motiva-
tions of local officials in structuring local governments. Inquiries of this kinds 
not only can be "unseemly," they intrude the federal courts-with only the va-
guest constitutional direction-into an area of intensely local and political 
concern. 
Id. at 629 (Powell,J., dissenting) (citation omitted). While Justice Powell does not deny 
that the Constitution prohibits policies reflecting "invidious purposes" (i.e., racial preju-
dice), he is concerned about erroneous judicial determinations that policies do reflect 
these impermissible purposes. But Powell and Rehnquist are quite willing to thwart 
local legislative choices, based on their own subjective, standardless notions of "fair-
ness," when reviewing the harmful impact of affirmative action programs on "innocent 
white victims." Thus, once again, it seems easier for some conservative Justices to find 
that ill-founded putative constitutional values have been violated when the interests of 
whites are adversely affected than to find that firmly established constitutional norms 
have been violated when the interests of blacks are adversely affected. 
180. One might object that this approach does not eliminate the possibility that an 
affirmative action program was adopted because of impermissible racism. But when the 
government has met the burden of identifying past racial discrimination and has pro-
vided a plausible causal connection between that history and present social disparities, 
the likelihood that the challenged racial classification was adopted because of impermis-
sible animus, favoritism, or stereotype is substantially diminished. It becomes far more 
plausible that the legislature has deemed its permissible remedial purpose sufficiently 
important to warrant sacrificing other concerns for a program that has some real chance 
of abating the effects of past racial discrimination. Indeed, when a facially neutral gov-
ernmental action is challenged as having been impermissibly motivated, the Court's ju-
dicial conservatives have chosen to place the burden of proof on the challenger, give the 
government the benefit of the doubt, and thereby increase the risk of erroneously up-
holding governmental actions that were, in fact, impermissibly motivated. Judicial con-
servatives have accepted this risk because it is plausible that a government will have 
acted for permissible, nonracist purposes when acting .through facially neutral means-
even when blacks are disproportionately harmed. See supra notes 41, 178. A consistent 
judicial conservative should give the benefit of the doubt to legislative discretion not 
only when it is plausible that a facially neutral policy has not been impermissibly moti-
vated (despite disproportionately harming blacks and other traditional victims of ra-
cism), but also when, after satisfying demanding procedural requirements to find facts 
and consider alternatives, it is plausible that an affirmative action program was not im-
permissibly motivated (despite employing a racial classification). 
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should be clear: the equities of harm caused by policies adopted for 
permissible purposes do not implicate values warranting judicial pro-
tection in the name of the equal protection clause. Thus, whatever de-
viations from the foregoing five propositions one might advocate, tests 
and barriers such as those in Croson, erected in the name of finding 
impermissible purpose, but motivated by concerns for "innocent white 
victims,'' 181 must be rejected in favor of tests and barriers designed ex-
clusively to smoke out impermissibl~ racism. Whatever the difficulties, 
a search for impermissible purpose is the only constitutional question 
implied by the Court's refusal to address the equities of harmful impact 
felt by blacks in Davis. And, toward finding unconstitutional racial dis-
crimination, it is the only question that a true judicial conservative 
would ask. 
CONCLUSION 
For judicial conservatives, Washington v. Davis was correctly de-
cided not because Test 21 provided the best way to select police of-
ficers, but because judges, in the name of the equal protection clause, 
should not impose a particular personal balance among competing per-
missible considerations on policymakers accountable to the electorate. 
Davis reflected a skeletal view of constitutional law and judicial review: 
courts should restrict legislative discretion only on the basis of public 
values clearly rooted in the electorate's past constitutional choices. 
This view of constitutional law vests in political majorities, local and 
national, primary responsibility for choosing good policy-for remain-
ing satisfied with the status quo, or for pushing toward something 
better. 
It is, at best, a sad irony that this view of constitutional law has 
been rejected by the Supreme Court's ascendant conservative wing 
when reviewing programs that benefit traditional victims of racism. 
When reviewing affirmative action programs, conservative Justices have 
ignored principles of federalism that are so important to judicial con-
servatives in other contexts. When reviewing affirmative action pro-
grams, conservative Justices have ignored the impropriety of judicially-
mandated resolutions of political controversies based only on their per-
sonal values-an impropriety that paralyzes judicial conservatives in 
other contexts. Conservative Justices have prevailed, using judicial 
conservatism merely as their slogan. There is a message here, about 
not only the proper constitutional law of affirmative action, but also the 
possibilities for consistently principled judicial behavior.182 
181. See supra text at notes 143-44. 
182. See generally Chang, A Critique of Judicial Supremacy (forthcoming in Villa-
nova Law Review, 1991) (arguing from perspective of contemporary national electorate 
that traditional faith in capacity of federal judges to perform tasks of judicial review is 
misplaced and may warrant curtailing conventional notions of judicial supremacy). 
